On Cross-Border Bank Credit and the U.S. Financial Crisis Transmission to Equity Markets by Yan, C. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Yan, C., Phylaktis, K. & Fuertes, A. (2016). On Cross-Border Bank Credit and 
the U.S. Financial Crisis Transmission to Equity Markets. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, doi: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.06.014 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/15758/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.06.014
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
 
 
On cross-border bank credit and the U.S. financial 
crisis transmission to equity markets  
 
Cheng Yan, Kate Phylaktis, Ana-Maria Fuertes 
 
 
November 3, 2015 
 
 
Accepted in Journal of International Money and Finance 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the role played by cross-border equity, bond and bank credit flows versus 
international trade in the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis to equity markets worldwide. 
We estimate vector autoregressive models with exogenous global factors using monthly data 
on 36 emerging and developed countries. The results from an eclectic methodology that 
includes causality tests, generalized impulse responses and forecast error variance 
decompositions indicate that the crisis is mostly transmitted through bank credit rather than 
portfolio flows and international trade. The results are robust to altering the exogenous versus 
endogenous vectors of variables, to measuring equity prices in U.S. dollars or local currency, 
to averaging the data across countries versus averaging the parameters from individual country 
estimation, and to redefining the start date of the crisis. The findings endorse the use of banking 
regulation and capital controls as part of the policy toolkit to limit financial vulnerability.  
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 1. Introduction 
Equity markets worldwide experienced a slump in the wake of the U.S. financial crisis. By the 
end of 2008, most equity indices had dropped to at least 50% of their 2006 levels (Bartram and 
Bodnar, 2009). There was also an unprecedented reduction in international trade and capital 
flows (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011; Claessens et al., 2012). The objective of this paper is to 
investigate through which channels the U.S. financial crisis affected equity returns in other 
developed and emerging countries and regions. The mainstream literature on crisis 
transmission conceptualizes both real (international trade) and financial linkages (capital flows) 
as observable factors that conform to the so-called fundamental channel, and unobservable 
factors such as panic, herd behavior and investor sentiment as conforming to the residual or 
non-fundamental channel. This paper focuses on the fundamental channels of crisis 
transmission.  
As stressed by Forbes (2013), “Much of the earlier literature focused on the fundamental 
question of whether contagion actually occurred during major crises …, still do not answer the 
fundamental question of why a negative shock is transmitted internationally and through what 
channels contagion occurs”. Understanding the mechanisms of the international transmission 
of the U.S. financial crisis is of interest to academics and policymakers, as some lessons could 
be learned. Since 2009 many emerging markets such as Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, 
and Thailand have implemented financial supervision and regulatory reforms. The IMF has not 
only relaxed its opposition to capital controls but rather included them as one of various tools 
to limit financial vulnerability.1 A good grasp of the role played by different crisis transmission 
channels is crucial for the design of appropriate policy responses. 
On the one hand, if the worldwide equity market slump was mainly channeled through 
                                                        
1 Various arguments in favor of using capital controls in addition to macroprudential measures are put forward by the IMF in 
the staff position note of Ostry et al. (2010). See also Rey (2013).  
3 
 
 
 
cross-border capital flows (such as “fire-sells” by panicked international portfolio investors or 
temporary bank liquidity withdrawals) providing liquidity or financial assistance could 
potentially have eased the post-crisis adjustment. On the other hand, if the U.S. financial crisis 
spread to other countries through a reduction of international trade  materializing as economic 
losses for trade-relevant firms and, in turn, as stock value declines  then capital mobility 
controls and liquidity injections would have been far less effective. A rather different scenario 
is where the U.S. financial crisis transmission to worldwide equity markets might have been 
driven by a global meltdown in confidence (or pure contagion) in which case a greater emphasis 
should have been placed on structural reforms to restore confidence and on strengthening 
macroeconomic fundamentals to reduce vulnerabilities.2 The transmission of the U.S. financial 
crisis more realistically occurred through a mix of fundamental and pure contagion channels. 
This paper investigates the relative role of various fundamental channels – traditional financial 
(equity, bond and bank credit flows) and real economic (international trade) linkages.  
Several aspects of our study differentiate it from extant research. First, we assess the 
relative importance of financial (equity, bond and bank credit) flows and international trade 
channels to exhaust all major fundamental channels. Second, we study the transmission role of 
capital flows and international trade in both net and gross terms since there is a strand of the 
literature which suggests that these two types of measures may convey different information 
regarding crisis transmission (Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Shin, 2012). Third, we take account 
of country heterogeneity in the degree of financial/economic development and global financial 
market integration of our large cross-section of 36 countries in two ways. The analysis is 
conducted using time-series data averaged across countries in five groups. Following Forbes 
(2013), three of those groups are formed using income (IMF country classifications of April 
                                                        
2 Following Bekaert et al. (2014) the term pure contagion is used here to refer to the transmission channels of crises that do 
not involve the direct or tangible real economic and financial (fundamental) channels. 
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2012) as main criteria – Eurozone advanced countries (EU), other advanced economies (OAE), 
and emerging markets (EM). The EM group includes some of the most dynamic and fastest-
growing economies in the world, such as China, India and Brazil. Since there is another strand 
of literature that focuses on Asian and Latin American countries (e.g., Bekaert et al, 2002, 
Fuertes et al., 2015), we also consider these two groupings by geographical location. Being 
mindful of some overlapping, we deliberately study these groups of countries to assess whether 
income or geographical location matters to the crisis transmission question. We also conduct 
the analysis at country level to allow for full country heterogeneity, as additional evidence.3 
As regards to the methodology, unlike the studies by Forbes (2013) and Kamin and 
DeMarco (2012) which are based on single-equation modeling approaches, we estimate vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models and generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) that are 
immune to the ordering of the variables in the VAR system. Specifically, we extend the VAR 
framework adopted by Froot et al. (2001) and Bekaert et al. (2002) in order to include not only 
equity flows and domestic equity returns, but also bond flows, bank credit, and international 
trade. One merit of the VAR framework is that it accommodates reverse causality between 
capital flows and equity returns as not only capital flows can drive equity returns (price pressure 
or information hypothesis), but also equity returns can further attract flows (return-chasing or 
momentum investing hypothesis). Following Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Forbes (2013), 
we include exogenous controls or push factors to account for global trends.4 Finally, we obtain 
forecast error variance decompositions for equity returns from a recursive VAR model. 
Due to the nature of our research question, we adopt a domestic country versus U.S. 
bilateral perspective for a large cross-section of 36 countries including both emerging and 
                                                        
3 There is a parallel literature on crisis transmission at individual country level; see e.g. Frankel and Saravelos (2012) and 
Bussière et al. (2015). 
4 Traditionally, analyses of international capital flows involving multiple economies use the term 'push' to refer to global factors 
affecting all countries such as the U.S. interest rate and 'pull' to refer to domestic or country-specific factors such as domestic 
equity returns (see, e.g. Bekaert et al., 2002; Forbes and Warnock, 2012). 
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developed economies. The sample covers the long period from January 1988 to December 2012. 
We conservatively adopt January 2007 as threshold to split the sample period into two sub- 
periods for comparison; the ‘control’ or ‘pre-crisis’ period is January 1988 to December 2006.5 
Among the different cross-border capital flows, we find that bank credit plays a significant 
role in the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis to equity markets, especially from the VAR-
based Granger causality tests and the variance decomposition analysis. The finding is more 
neatly revealed in the VAR models based on net capital flows and trade as opposed to gross 
capital flows and trade. Cross-border bank credit plays a significant role in the U.S. financial 
crisis transmission for all five country groups but the evidence is strongest (as consistently 
shown by the main VAR analysis and battery of robustness checks) for the EM group. The 
lagged effect of net bank credit on equity returns during the crisis period is particularly large 
for EMs, which aligns well with the fact that pre-crisis the net bank credit is on average large 
and positive for the EM group, exceeding that of other groups, and indicates large reliance on 
U.S. bank credit. The same applies to total capital flows, that is, the sum of equity, bond and 
bank credit, as they are dominated by the latter. The findings also reveal that, although the post-
subprime crisis slump in equity markets was a pervasive phenomenon, for many countries the 
causality from fundamental capital flows and trade to equity returns is very tenuous and 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that other channels such as contagion in the form of 
“wake-up” calls, and contagion driven by market sentiments of panic and fear might have also 
contributed to the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis to equities. 
Our paper complements a growing literature on the U.S. financial crisis transmission. 
                                                        
5 Early signs of the subprime crisis show at the start of 2007. From January 5 to February 7, various U.S. mortgage lenders 
filed for bankruptcy (e.g., Ownit Mortgage Solutions, American Freedom Mortgage and Mortgage Lenders Network). On 
February 8, one of the world’s largest banks, HSBC announces the provisioning of about $11billion as extra funds to cover 
losses linked to U.S. subprime mortgages. On February 26, comments by former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, 
set off market tremors. On February 27, the Dow Jones drops 3.3%. By April 2007, over 50 mortgage companies had declared 
bankruptcy. In August 2007, BNP Paribas announced it could not value its subprime mortgage-backed securities portfolio. 
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Claessens et al. (2010) and Blanchard et al. (2010) argue that countries more integrated with 
global financial markets have suffered greater output losses during the crisis. Broner et al. 
(2006) show that equity flows are an important factor in the propagation of financial shocks 
across countries. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) find a role in the recent crisis transmission for 
short-term debt in foreign currency. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a, b, c) show that global 
banking plays a key role in the crisis transmission since a shock to the banking system of a 
country reduces its supply of credit to other countries. Tong and Wei (2011) ascribe a role to 
global banking via a reduction in lending by domestic banks following cross-border shocks to 
their balance sheets. Brière et al. (2012) find that “flight-to-quality” prevails in crisis and that 
contagion (defined as the increase in cross-market linkages after a shock) is an artifact of 
globalization. It has also been shown that international trade can transmit crisis through import 
demand and export competition (Glick and Rose, 1999; Claessens et al., 2012).  
By contrast, Rose and Spiegel (2010, 2011) find no evidence that international trade and 
financial linkages were the main channels of the U.S. financial crisis transmission. Kamin and 
DeMarco (2012) analyze industrial countries that held large amounts of U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities and find that neither foreign exposures to ‘toxic’ U.S. assets nor foreign vulnerability 
to dollar funding pressures can by themselves explain the crisis transmission. Bekaert et al. 
(2014) find instead that “wake-up calls” and domestic banking policies played an important 
role in the global transmission of the U.S. financial crisis. Our paper relates to another strand 
of the literature that studies the dynamics of disaggregated capital flows, and/or considers gross 
and net flow measures. Not all capital flows have the same degree of reversibility. Equity and 
bond flows have been historically more reversible than bank credit flows (Sarno and Taylor, 
1999; Levchenko and Mauro, 2007; Tong and Wei, 2011). But the amount of “hot money” in 
cross-border bank credit and hence, the degree of reversibility of bank credit flows, notably 
increases post-1990s as shown by Fuertes et al. (2015). Also, even if a country’s current 
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account is relatively balanced, it may mask large gross inflows that are balanced by large gross 
outflows and so the country is still vulnerable to shocks (Gourinchas and Rey, 2007; Forbes 
and Warnock, 2012; Broner et al., 2013). Shin (2012) argues that even when the net bank credit 
is balanced, the gross bank credit may be large and may transmit crisis, similar to portfolio flows.  
Finally, in studying how financial events in the U.S. were transmitted globally to equity 
markets, our paper adds to Bartram and Bodnar (2009), Tong and Wei (2011), Kamin and 
DeMarco (2012) and Forbes (2013). Studying instead the transmission to CDS markets (as e.g., 
Eichengreen et al. 2012; Kamin and DeMarco, 2012) is precluded in our paper because CDS 
data is not so widely available in cross-section and time span. Nonetheless, there is high 
dependence between CDS premia and stock prices particularly in crisis (e.g., Fei et al., 2013). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology 
and data. The main empirical results are discussed in Section 3, while and Section 4 provides 
a battery of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
2. Methodology and data  
2.1 VAR models  
Our empirical analysis of the U.S. financial crisis transmission to equity markets is framed 
within the vector autoregressive (VAR) modeling approach.6 The VAR model of order one that 
we adopt to analyze the dynamics of monthly time-series can be compactly written as7 
𝒀𝒊,𝒕 = 𝝁 + 𝑨𝒀𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝑩𝑿𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊,𝒕,                                            (1) 
                                                        
6 A VAR model of order p, denoted VAR (p), consists of n equations that express each of the n endogenous variables as a linear 
function of its own p lags and the p lags of the remaining n-1 variables. This is called reduced-form VAR because it can be 
cast as a reduced form of a dynamic economic system involving n variables with uncorrelated structural shocks (structural 
VAR with diagonal covariance matrix∑𝜺). The structural parameters can be obtained from the VAR parameters through the 
Choleski decomposition of ∑𝒆 which amounts to formulating a recursive VAR by imposing contemporaneous restrictions. The 
ordering 𝒀𝑖𝑡 = (𝑦1,𝑖𝑡 , … , 𝑦𝑛,𝑖𝑡)′  implies that 𝑦1,𝑡  is not contemporaneously affected by any other variables, 𝑦2,𝑖𝑡  is 
contemporaneously affected by shocks to the preceding variable 𝑦1,𝑡 but not any others, and so forth.
 
7 We formulate the general specification 𝒀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝝁 + 𝑨(𝐿)𝒀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑩(𝐿)𝑿𝑡 + 𝒆𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑨(𝐿) = 𝑨1 + 𝑨2𝐿 + ⋯ + 𝑨𝑘−1𝐿
𝑘−1 
and 𝑩(𝐿) = 𝑩1 + 𝑩2𝐿 + ⋯ + 𝑩𝐽−1𝐿
𝐽−1  are lag polynomial matrices corresponding to the endogenous and exogenous 
variables, respectively. The standard Ljung-Box test is employed to identify the lag parameter k needed to absorb all residual 
autocorrelation; the lag parameter j  k is subsequently chosen according to the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Allowing 
for lags up to 12 months, both criteria predominantly select k=j=1 in line with Dahlquist and Robertsson (2004). 
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where bold font is used to unambiguously denote vectors and matrices; i=1,2,…,N are 
countries and t=1,2,…,T are months in the estimation sample. The vector 𝒆𝑡 collects white 
noise errors with covariance matrix 𝐸(𝒆𝑖𝑡𝒆𝑖𝜏
′ ) = ∑𝒆  for 𝑡 = 𝜏 and 𝐸(𝒆𝑖𝑡𝒆𝑖𝜏
′ ) = 𝟎  for 𝑡 ≠ 𝜏 ; 
namely, the errors have zero means, constant variances, and are non-autocorrelated but 
correlated across equations. The endogenous vector 𝒀𝑡 of dimension n=6 in the present context 
is defined in two distinct ways; hence, two VAR models are considered. In one model, the 
endogenous variables are the U.S. Federal funds rate (ffr), the country-specific gross equity 
flows (gef), gross bond flows (gbf), gross bank credit (gbc), gross international trade (gt), and 
equity returns (ret); thus 𝒀𝑖𝑡 ≡ (𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡, 𝑔𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 , 𝑔𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑡 , 𝑔𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡)′ . The second model is 
based on 𝒀𝑖𝑡 ≡ (𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡, 𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑛𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡)′ where n denotes net terms.  
In both models, following Forbes (2013) and others, we include as exogenous variables 
the VXO equity volatility index, the S&P-GSCI commodity (total return) index and the 10-
year Treasury yield. VXO is a forward-looking measure of “economic uncertainty” or “risk” 
that captures both the riskiness of financial assets as well as global investor risk aversion. S&P-
GSCI serves as broad indicator of economic conditions. The 10-year Treasury bond yield acts 
as proxy for long term global interest rates; 8 that is, 𝑿𝑡 ≡ (𝑉𝑋𝑂𝑡, 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝑖𝑡,10)′.  
The unknown parameters are the constants, the coefficients of the endogenous variables, 
and the coefficients of the exogenous factors which are collected, respectively, in the matrices 
𝝁 = [
𝜇1
⋮
𝜇6
] , 𝑨 = [
𝑎11 ⋯ 𝑎16
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎61 ⋯ 𝑎66
] , 𝑩 = [
𝑏11 ⋯ 𝑎13
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑎61 ⋯ 𝑎63
],                            (2) 
and the (co)variances of the white noise disturbances which are gathered in the matrix 
                                                        
8 VXO and VIX are highly correlated measures of market expectations of stock market volatility (see Forbes and Warnock, 
2012). VXO is an estimate of the at-the-money implied volatility on the S&P 100 equity index. VIX is an average of out-of-
money option price volatility across all available strikes on the S&P 500 equity index. VXO is backdated to 1986 so it can be 
used in our control sample whereas VIX is only backdated to 1990. The total return S&P-GSCI measures the returns accrued 
from investing in fully collateralized nearby commodity futures. The commodity components qualify for inclusion in the index 
according to liquidity measures and are weighted in relation to their global production levels (see Rallis et al., 2013).   
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∑𝒆 =  [
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒1,𝑖𝑡) ⋯ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑒1,𝑖𝑡, 𝑒6,𝑖𝑡)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑒1,𝑖𝑡, 𝑒6,𝑖𝑡) ⋯ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒1,𝑖𝑡)
]                 (3) 
Using aggregated monthly time-series across all countries (N=36) and across groups of 
countries, we estimate 𝝁, 𝑨, 𝑩 and ∑𝒆 by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method which is 
consistent and asymptotically efficient. We carry out individual country-by-country estimation 
of the VAR model parameters as one of several robustness checks below. 
The inclusion of the U.S. Fed funds rate as one of the endogenous variables in the VAR 
system follows from Bekaert et al. (2002) and Rey (2013). It is important to control for the 
effects on capital flows, trade and equity markets of the monetary policy adopted by the U.S. 
in the aftermath of the crisis. There is evidence that ultra-expansive Fed policy tends to dampen 
investors’ risk aversion and encourages hot money flows into emerging markets (Bruno and 
Shin, 2012; Bekaert et al., 2013; Rey, 2013; McKinnon, 2014). The theoretical impact of 
monetary policy on trade is less obvious. On the one hand, U.S. expansionary policy is likely 
to stimulate U.S. import demand which would worsen the U.S. trade balance. However, an 
ultra-low Fed rate may weaken the international value of the U.S. dollar, which may decrease 
imports and increase exports and improve the U.S. trade balance. We initially conceptualize 
the Fed funds rate as endogenous but later (robustness tests) it is treated as exogenous. 
2.2 Data description and preliminary analysis 
We employ data on 15 emerging economies, 21 advanced economies (and the U.S.) from 
January 1988 to December 2012 (N=36 countries; T=300 months with a few exceptions as 
detailed in Table I). The bilateral capital outflow and inflow data are obtained from the U.S. 
Treasury International Capital (TIC) database. The bilateral trade data are obtained from the 
U.S. Census Bureau, and the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Tariffs and Trade 
databases. Following most of the literature we scale capital flows and trade, expressed in 
10 
 
 
 
current US$ million, by domestic GDP in current US$ billion. The equity returns, defined as 
logarithmic monthly changes in dividend-adjusted MSCI global equity indexes in U.S. dollars, 
and the VXO, S&P GSCI and 10-year Treasury yield data are from DataStream. 
Net capital flows for a given country are outflows from the U.S. (inflows to the country) 
minus inflows to the U.S. (outflows from the country). Thus, a positive net flow for a given 
country during a period means that money as a whole flowed into the country (on account 
of purchases of equity or bonds, or bank lending) from the U.S. or that the U.S. is financing 
the country. We use the traditional definition of net trade for a given country vis-à-vis the U.S. 
as exports from the U.S. (to the country) minus imports to the U.S. (from the country) so that 
a positive net trade – a trade surplus for the U.S. and a trade deficit for the given country – 
signifies that on the whole money is flowing out of the country to the U.S. on account of 
bilateral transactions of goods and services. Gross capital flows (or trade) are defined as the 
sum of capital outflows and inflows (or exports and imports). Table I provides summary 
statistics for all the flows expressed in net terms; the counterpart statistics for the gross 
variables are omitted, due to space constraints, but available from the authors upon request. 
First, we begin by estimating the two VAR models described above using aggregate time 
series across the entire cross-section (N=36 countries) using both equal-weights and 
standardized value-weights. The latter are constructed from equity market capitalization data 
for December 2012 from the World Bank database. Second, in order to investigate whether 
intrinsic country characteristics play a role in the nature of the transmission we estimate the 
VARs using data aggregated across five country groups which are explained next.  
As noted earlier, using income we group the countries as Eurozone advanced countries 
(EU), other advanced economies (OAE), and emerging markets (EM), and using geographical 
location as Asia and Latin America. The composition of each group is described in Table I.  
[Insert Table I around here] 
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Figure I plots the monthly dividend-adjusted MSCI equity prices in US$ for each of the 
36 countries; Panels A, B and C pertain to EU, OAE and EM countries, respectively. Panel D 
plots the equal-weighted average equity market prices for these groups alongside those for the 
Asian and Latin American groups. The graphs show that the financial events in the U.S. are 
felt by all equity markets at some point between the second half of 2007 and the end of 2008; 
this confirms that there is “no place to hide” from the crisis (Bartram and Bodnar, 2009).  
[Insert Figure I around here] 
Unsurprisingly, the extent of the equity market collapse and subsequent recovery time 
varies from country to country. The U.S. equity market roughly went back to its early 2007 
level before the end of the sample period in 2012, some EMs earlier than that, but most EU 
countries are by 2012 still below their pre-crisis levels. As suggested by the percentage equity 
price changes from January 2007 to January 2010 shown in Table II, the recovery rates differ 
across regions, faster for Latin American countries followed by Asian countries and EMs. 
[Insert Table II around here] 
The different dynamics of net and gross trade flows are illustrated in Figure II for Brazil 
and Philippines alongside exports (from the U.S.) and imports (to the U.S.). Philippines ranks 
well ahead of Brazil in terms of gross trade but their positions reverse with net trade as reflected 
also in the descriptive statistics of Table I. In both countries, net trade experiences an upward 
trend in the run-up to the U.S. financial crisis but gross trade trends downwards; the contrast is 
due to the fact that exports from the U.S. experience a downward trend but imports too and 
more sharply which is possible due to income and wealth effects in the U.S.  
[Insert Figure II around here] 
Finally, we should stress the rationale for choosing January 2007 as threshold date. Since 
our question is how the U.S. financial crisis (that originates in the subprime mortgage sector) 
transmits to equity markets worldwide, we cannot ignore the fact that various U.S. financial 
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institutions started to show signs of distress in the early months of 2007. In adopting January 
2007 (instead of going further into the year) as “crisis” start date, we take a conservative 
approach as it would be undesirable to contaminate the control period with crisis observations. 
Moreover, in order to support empirically our choice of threshold date we conduct the 
Chow F-test for the significance of a ‘2007 dummy’ variable (equal to 1 from January 2007 
onwards and 0 elsewhere) in the VAR models estimated on equal-weighted and value-weighted 
average data across all 36 countries. The null hypothesis states that the dummy variable 
coefficients are zero in all VAR equations (𝐻0: 𝜇𝑓𝑓𝑟
2007 = 𝜇𝑔𝑒𝑓
2007 = ⋯ = 𝜇𝑟𝑒𝑡
2007 = 0); likewise for 
the net terms VAR model. The significant F-statistic of 40.32 (25.77) for gross (net) variables 
in the VAR model estimated with equal-weighted average data suggests that there is a break in 
January 2007. Likewise, the F-statistic for the VAR model estimated with value-weighted 
average data across all countries (at 47.96 and 14.66, respectively, for the gross and net terms 
models) confirms the presence of a structural break in January 2007. Moreover, these findings 
are confirmed by the Wald test statistic using the corresponding asymptotic 
(1)
2  distribution. 
3. Empirical results 
We present results from various standard tools within the VAR framework that permit us to 
gauge from different angles the relative contributions of capital (equity, bond and bank credit) 
flows and international trade to the worldwide decline of equity returns post U.S. subprime 
crisis. Section 4.1 discusses the evidence from the VAR coefficient estimates and Granger 
causality tests. Section 4.2 discusses the findings from generalized impulse response functions 
and Section 4.3 discusses the forecast error variance decomposition.9 
3.1 VAR model coefficients and Granger-causality tests 
We begin by taking a look at the estimation results for the two VAR models, respectively, based 
                                                        
9 The software package STATA v.12 is employed to conduct the empirical analysis.  
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on gross and net capital flows and trade variables. Table III reports the coefficient estimates for 
the market return equation which, given the purposes of our investigation, is the main equation 
of interest. Panels I and II pertain to the pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. Columns (1) 
and (2) report VAR estimation results based on monthly observations averaged across the entire 
cross-section of 36 countries using equal-weights and value-weights, respectively. Columns (3) 
to (7) report the corresponding results for equally-weighted average data across EU, OAE, EM, 
Asian and Latin American groups.  
[Insert Table III around here] 
Next we conduct a standard t-test for the null hypothesis that gross equity flows (gross 
bond flows, gross bank credit or gross trade) do not Granger-cause equity returns; namely, the 
coefficient of the corresponding lagged variable in the equity returns equation is zero, 
𝐻0: 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑔𝑒𝑓 = 0  ( 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑔𝑏𝑓 = 0; 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑔𝑏𝑐 = 0; 𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑔𝑏𝑐 = 0)  using the notation in (2). 
Likewise, for the VAR model formulated with net variables. The corresponding test statistic 
for each hypothesis is shown in italics in Table III. Most of the rejections of the ‘no Granger-
causality (toward equity market returns)’ hypothesis in the crisis period pertain to the bank 
credit flows and this result is robust to using gross versus net capital flow/trade variables.  
The most noticeable contrast between the pre-crisis and crisis period pertains to the 
coefficients of lagged gross bank credit on equity market returns. While no causality is detected 
pre-crisis, the coefficient of lagged gross bank credit is significant and positive in many cases 
(country groupings) during the crisis period. This is plausible as it suggests that a decrease in 
gross bank credit during the crisis had an adverse impact on equity markets worldwide. This 
provides evidence that banks have played a dominant role in the U.S. financial crisis 
transmission to the rest of the world. The coefficient of lagged gross bank credit is significant 
and positive consistently for various country groupings; namely, in the VAR model estimated 
with equal-weighted time-series aggregated for all 36 countries, for EM and EU countries.  
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There is no evidence of Granger causality from gross bank credit flows to equity market 
returns during the crisis according to the VAR estimated with data averaged across all 36 
countries using value-weights and for the (equal-weights) OAE group estimation; in fact, the 
concurrence of results in these two cases is plausible given that the largest equity markets (by 
value) tend to be those of OAEs as documented in Table I. There is no evidence of causality 
from gross bank credit to equity returns for the Asian and Latin American countries. 
The coefficient estimates and Granger causality tests in the net terms VAR model, shown 
in Panel B of Table III, confirm the dominant role played by bank credit.10 We observe that 
while lagged net bank credit has a muted effect on equity market returns during the pre-crisis 
period, it has a significant effect during the crisis period and the effect of bank credit dominates 
that of other fundamental channels of crisis transmission such as equity flows, bond flows and 
trade. The effect of lagged net bank credit on equity returns is significant and negative in the 
VAR model estimated with equally-weighted average data for OAE, EM, Asian and Latin 
American countries; the effect is strongest for EMs and Latin American countries. The 
coefficient of lagged net bank credit on equity market returns is significant and positive in the 
VAR model estimated with average (equal-weights) data for all 36 countries and EU countries.  
The contrasting coefficient sign may relate to whether the corresponding country group is 
dominated by countries that are on the whole financed by the U.S. according to the value of 
net bank credit (or net capital flows, since the net bank credit notably exceeds the net equity 
and net bond flows) in which case a positive sign is plausible, or instead dominated by countries 
that are financing the U.S. in which case a negative sign is more plausible. In the wake of the 
U.S. financial crisis, not only U.S. banks withdraw their credit to other countries but also banks 
                                                        
10 The finding that bank credit flows affected equity returns more strongly than portfolio flows is seemingly a paradox. It may 
relate to the fact that equity flows are not as easily tractable as bank flows because they partly go through financial hubs, while 
we rely on bilateral flow data. Furthermore, bank credit can affect equity prices not only via the well-known traditional banking 
linkages (direct cross-border lending) but also indirect ones through an international affiliate/branch/subsidiary (internal capital 
market, in the terminology of Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a, b, c) or a reduction in domestic lending by banks following cross-
border shocks to their balance sheets (Tong and Wei 2011, Forbes, 2013). We thank a referee for pointing this out. 
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in other countries liquidate their investments in the U.S. at distressed or fire-sale prices and 
suffer losses in proportion to the position they deleverage "flight-to-quality" (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2008), or "running for the exit" (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). The former 
leads to a drop of equity markets in other countries because of lack of foreign liquidity and thus 
a positive relationship between our defined "net bank credit" and local equity returns, while the 
later can also cause equity declines in the other countries because the crisis-affected domestic 
banks reduce lending to their domestic non-financial firms in their own countries in order to 
return to target leverage, and that creates a negative relationship between net bank credit and 
local equity returns.11 The overall sign roughly depends on whether there is more bank credit 
from the U.S. to the other country (i.e., the other country is financed by the U.S.), or the other 
way around (i.e., the U.S. is financed by the other country). We conjecture a positive sign in 
the former case (the EU), but a negative sign in the latter case (the OAE, EM, Asia and LA). 
More specifically, as Table I shows, half of the countries in the EU group rank top by 
positive net bank credit (i.e., countries mostly financed by the U.S.) and four prominent 
examples in terms of positive net bank credit are Finland, Netherlands, Ireland and France, 
which are precisely in the EU group for which a positive sign is found. On the other hand, the 
four biggest players among all 36 countries with negative net bank credit (i.e., outflows from 
the U.S. are outweighed by inflows to the U.S.; these are countries that are mostly financing 
the U.S.) are Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and UK which are precisely in the OAE group 
for which a negative sign is found.  
Since the main influence of lagged capital flows on month t-1 to equity market returns on 
month t is detected for bank credit, it is pertinent to scrutinize the evolution of monthly bank 
credit over the sample period. Figure III plots in Panel A and Panel B the gross and net bank 
                                                        
11 In other words, in the former case the fall in bank credit inflows to the other country, reduces net bank credit leading to a 
fall in equities and a positive sign, while in the second case there is a decrease in bank credit outflows from the other country 
to the US, increasing net bank credit flows leading to a fall in equities again and to a negative sign. 
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credit, respectively. The left-side of each panel plots aggregate bank credit (that is, summarized 
as an equal-weighted average) for EU, OAE, EM, Asian and Latin American countries. The 
right-side of each panel plots the bank credit for each of 6 representative countries, Switzerland 
(SW), Ireland (IR), Taiwan (TW), Singapore (SP), Hungary (HN) and the United Kingdom 
(UK). SW and IR are chosen because they are both EU countries that rank top according to 
their net bank credit and total net capital flows (large positive values as Table I shows) and thus, 
they are being financed by the U.S. on the whole. TW and SP are chosen because they rank 
bottom according to net bank credit and total net capital flows (negative values) so they are 
financing the U.S. overall. Finally, the UK and HN are chosen because they rank top and bottom, 
respectively, in terms of gross bank credit and total gross capital flows.  
[Insert Figure III around here] 
It turns out that during the crisis period the aggregate net bank credit of EU countries shows 
a stark contrast with that for other country groups. First, their level is overall higher suggesting 
that EU countries are largely reliant on U.S. bank credit outflows. Second and related to the 
latter, although EU net bank credit increases even further in 2007 it suffers a very sharp and 
persistent decline thereafter. Similar dynamics are clearly observed in Switzerland which is the 
top ranked country over the entire cross-section of 36 countries in terms of net bank credit and 
Ireland also pertaining to the top net bank credit group (both EU countries). These insights help 
to rationalize the positive effect of lagged net bank credit on EU equity markets, namely, the 
net bank credit of EU countries fell sharply during the crisis period and their equity markets 
also fell. Such a sharp and persistent downward trend in net bank credit post-2007 is not 
observed for the other country groupings, in fact, net bank credit of OAE, EM, Asian and Latin 
American countries fluctuates around an underlying upward trend for from 2007 to 2012. 
Moreover, the equity markets of those countries also fell sharply. This explains the negative 
effect of lagged net bank credit on equity returns for these country groups.  
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3.2 Generalized impulse response functions 
Next we employ the framework of generalized impulse responses developed by Pesaran and 
Shin (1998) to analyze the effect of an unexpected one-standard-deviation shock to equity 
flows, bond flows, bank credit or trade on equity market returns. The GIRFs are constructed 
from an orthogonal set of innovations that is invariant to the ordering of variables in the VAR. 
Figure IV shows the cumulative impulse responses from the two VAR models with gross versus 
net capital flows and trade variables, respectively, estimated with aggregate (i.e., equal-
weighted averaged) data across countries. The sample period for the estimation is the crisis 
period defined conservatively to begin on January 2007 until December 2012. 
[Insert Figure IV around here] 
A unit shock in gross bank credit leads to a relatively large reaction in equity market returns 
of EM, EU and Latin American countries as shown in Panel C. The positive association 
confirms our previous finding that, during the crisis period, the sharp falls in equity markets 
were largely driven by corresponding declines in gross bank credit flows. The response of 
equity market returns to gross bank credit is more muted for Asian and OAE countries which, 
interestingly, rank ahead of the other country groups in terms of the magnitude of gross trade 
(as shown in Figure III, top left graph). Across all country groups, the response of equity returns 
is smaller in magnitude when gross equity flows or gross bond flows are shocked instead. Also 
across all country groups, a positive (negative) shock in gross trade leads to a decrease (increase) 
in equity returns which does not support the notion that trade transmitted the financial events 
in the U.S. globally to equity markets.12  
The lower half of Figure IV depicts the GIRFs based on net capital flows and trade. Once 
again, the reaction of equity market returns is relatively large in magnitude when the impulse 
                                                        
12 Our model can be seen as more completely specified for financial flows than trade flows. Trade flows have been the object 
of extensive analysis and there is consensus that trade flows behave rather differently from financial flows. Specifically, the 
trade dynamics is slower than that of financial flows: the Great Trade Collapse took place after the Great Retrenchment of 
financial flows, and may have coincided by the rebound in equity returns (see, e.g., Baldwin, 2009, and Bussière et al., 2013). 
The results reported on Figure IV reflect these different dynamics.  
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pertains to the net bank credit. A positive shock to net bank credit has a largely persistent effect 
in the same direction on equity markets of EU countries and in the opposite direction on OAE, 
EM, Asian and Latin American countries. Irrespective of the sign, the effect is largest in 
magnitude for Latin American, EM and EU countries (see Panel G). This is plausible in the 
light of the net bank credit trend pre-crisis observed in the bottom left graph of Figure III; 
clearly, these three groups rank top in terms of the size of net bank credit (top reliant) which 
rationalizes their larger transmission effect. We find much smaller impacts of net portfolio 
(equity and bond) flows and international trade on local equity returns in the crisis period.  
3.3. Forecast error variance decomposition  
In this section, we assess the role of capital (equity, bond, bank credit) flows and international 
trade in transmitting the U.S. financial crisis to equity markets through a forecast error variance 
decomposition. This innovation accounting approach differs from the GIRFs in that it is based 
on the recursive re-formulation of the VAR model, with endogenous vector 𝒀𝑖𝑡 ≡ (𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡, 𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 ,
𝑛𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑡 , 𝑛𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡)′  or 𝒀𝑖𝑡 ≡ (𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡, 𝑔𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑏𝑐𝑖𝑡, 𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡)
′, via the Choleski 
decomposition to achieve orthogonal structural shocks.  
Dropping the country subscript i for simplicity, let 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡+𝑛) denote the n-step-ahead 
forecast of the equity market return from the corresponding recursive VAR equation. It is 
possible to decompose the variance of the forecast error, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡+𝑛), as the sum of 
the proportions due to temporary one-unit-standard-deviation uncorrelated structural shocks 
(𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑟,𝑡𝜀𝑔𝑒𝑓,𝑡 ,...,𝜀𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑡)′ where 𝜀𝑓𝑓𝑟,𝑡 is the first error term in the recursive VAR system. The 
Choleski decomposition constrains the contemporaneous links among the endogenous 
variables; namely, 𝐸(𝒆𝑡𝒆𝜏
′ ) = ∑𝒆 = 𝑩
′𝑩, and 𝜺𝑡 = 𝑩
−1𝒆𝑡 with 𝑩
−𝟏 an upper triangular 6 × 6 
matrix so that 𝐸(𝜺𝑡𝜺𝜏
′ ) = ∑𝜺  is a diagonal matrix of constant error variances and 
(𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑟,𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑓,𝑡 ,...,𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑡,𝑡)′ are the correlated shocks in the reduced-VAR system (1). Hence, in 
contrast with the Granger-causality tests and GIRFs, the variance decomposition is linked to 
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the VAR ordering which imposes specific contemporaneous restrictions. The ordering adopted 
implies that the Fed rate (first) variable is affected within the same month by its own shocks 
but not by shocks to any of the country-specific capital flows and trade variables, the equity 
flow (second) variable is contemporaneously affected by its own shocks and by shocks to the 
Fed rate, and so on. Since we want to measure the impact of cross-border capital flows and 
trade shocks on equity market returns (which, by being ordered last in the VAR system, can 
potentially respond to any of the other endogenous variables), how the preceding variables are 
ordered is immaterial to the forecast error variance decomposition for the equity returns. 
Table IV shows the percentage of the total forecast error variance of equity returns at 
horizons of 𝑛 = {1, 6, 12} months that can be ascribed to capital flows and trade shocks. In 
spite of the stronger share of the variance that is attributable to the own equity return shocks, 
this variance decomposition is reminiscent of our previous results because it reveals a relatively 
tight link between equity market returns and cross-border bank credit.  
[Insert Table IV around here] 
The recursive VAR model formulated in gross terms clearly reveals for three country groupings 
 EU, EM and Asian countries  that among capital (equity, bond and bank credit) flows and 
trade, the largest share of the variance of equity market returns corresponds to gross bank credit 
shocks. To illustrate, for the EU advanced economies as a whole, 16% of the forecast error 
variance 12 months ahead can be ascribed to gross bank credit shocks, 3% to gross equity flows, 
0.4% to gross bond flows and 4% to gross trade shocks; the remaining corresponds principally 
to own equity market shocks (74%) and less so to the Fed rate (2%).  
The recursive VAR model in net terms yields even more persuasive evidence of the 
predominant role of cross-border bank credit in transmitting the U.S. financial crisis to equity 
markets worldwide. The variance decomposition reveals almost uniformly across all five 
country groupings that net bank credit shocks are responsible for the largest share of the 
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forecast error variance. Again to illustrate, for the EU advanced economies as a whole over 25% 
of the 12-month ahead forecast error variance is due to net bank credit shocks, while only 4% 
to net equity flows, 0.4% to net bond flows and 2% to gross trade shocks; the remaining 
variation is due to equity shocks (63%) and Fed rate shocks (5%).  
As a whole, our examination of a large cross-section of 36 countries (vis-à-vis the U.S.) 
over the period January 1988 to December 2012 thus far reveals that the dynamics of cross-
border bank credit is a major driver of the slump in global equity markets that ensued the U.S. 
financial crisis. The finding is more strongly revealed in the VAR models based on net capital 
flows as opposed to gross capital flows, and the contrast may be explained as follows. The 
international claims of global banks from BIS reporting countries has grown tenfold over the 
last twenty years peaking at around $25 trillion in 2007 (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012c). Apart 
from cross-border lending, banks have set up branches in foreign locations to serve their clients. 
When these global banks are faced with a funding shock, they apply basic corporate finance 
principles by activating capital markets internal to the organization, reallocating funds across 
locations in response to their relative needs. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012c) confirm the 
existence of an active cross-border, internal capital market. In this internal funding allocation 
process, the parent bank is arguably most concerned with the net (as opposed to gross) bank 
credit flow positions at each specific location and their impact on the banking organization. 
4. Robustness tests 
Seeking to add robustness to our main findings, we reformulate the VAR models. First, we 
consider more heavily parameterized model specifications where all six endogenous variables 
enter lagged one and two months. Second, we consider capital flows and trade data scaled by 
domestic equity market capitalization instead of GDP. Third, we add the TED spread (for which 
monthly data are obtained from DataStream) to the original vector of exogenous or global 
factors. Measured as the difference between 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month T-bill rate, the 
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TED spread is a great indicator of interbank credit risk and the perceived health of the banking 
system; thus the exogenous vector comprises the VXO, GSCI changes, the 10 year U.S. 
government bond yield and the TED spread, 𝑿𝑡 ≡ (𝑉𝑋𝑂𝑡, 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝑖𝑡,10, 𝑇𝐸𝐷)′.  
As a fourth robustness check, the Fed rate is conceptualized as exogenous, thus 𝑿𝑡 ≡
(𝑉𝑋𝑂𝑡, 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝑖𝑡,10, 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑡)
′
. Fifth, the exogenous vector is further expanded as 𝑿𝑡 ≡
(𝑉𝑋𝑂𝑡, 𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡, 𝑖𝑡,10, 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑡, 𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑡)
′
. Finally, in line with the post-Keynesian horizontalist theory 
and motivated by the empirical findings in Warnock and Warnock (2009), we treat the long-
term interest rate (𝑖𝑡,10) as endogenous and the Fed funds rate as exogenous. Warnock and 
Warnock (2009) find that large foreign inflows into U.S. bonds have depressed long-term U.S. 
interest rates and, in turn, spurred U.S. economic activity; long-term U.S. interest rates have 
been lower than they would have been in a world of larger net bond flows. 
For space constraints, we report a summary of the latest four robustness checks in Panels 
A to D of Table V, respectively. The table reports the results for the VAR model formulated 
with net variables but we note that, as in the main analysis, the role of bank credit is not as 
clearly revealed with gross variables. All unreported results are available from the authors upon 
request. The findings are robust to all the above model re-specifications. 
[Insert Table V around here] 
Next the endogenous variable of main interest for the present purposes, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡, is defined 
as the equity market returns in local currencies instead of common U.S. dollars. The results 
reported in Panel E provide interesting reading. Bank credit remains the predominant channel 
of transmission of financial events in the U.S. to equity markets worldwide. However, the 
relatively weaker evidence of crisis transmission suggested by the VAR model with equity 
returns computed from US$ denominated indices further lessens when we consider local 
currency denominated equity indices. This suggests that our initial VAR model may also be 
capturing a part of the financial crisis transmission that occurred through the FOREX market.  
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Regarding the relative importance given to individual countries in each group (i.e., EU 
OAE, EM, Asian and Latin American countries) we re-estimate the VAR models using value-
weighted averaged data for each group; that is, weights defined according to 2012:12 equity 
market capitalization figures appropriately normalized so that they sum to one for each group. 
Thus, for instance, while in the main analysis the VAR coefficients for the EU group are 
estimated using equal-weighted averaged data across countries, now France, Germany and 
Spain receive a much larger weight (29.84%, 24.33% and 16.29%, respectively) by equity 
market capitalization. Clearly, bank credit dominates the causality effects towards equity 
market returns in the crisis period, reinforcing our main findings. Panel F of Table V shows the 
VAR coefficients based on value-weighted average data across countries in each group. 
Then we estimate the VAR models individually country by country. Following Brun-
Aguerre et al. (2012) and others, the individual country coefficients thus obtained are used to 
estimate panel coefficients and to deploy Granger causality tests following the Mean Group 
approach proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995); the corresponding t-statistics are based on 
the standard deviation of the individual country estimates. In essence, this is a dynamic panel 
estimation approach that allows for full country heterogeneity. Panel G of Table V shows the 
Mean Group estimates and causality tests for the VAR in net terms.  
The results are reminiscent of our main finding (from the VAR models estimated with 
average data across countries) of a predominant role for bank credit. The coefficients of the 
equity returns equation obtained through country-by-country estimation are shown in Appendix 
A as a “heat map”; light (or dark) grey shade indicates significant Granger causality from the 
corresponding variable to equity market returns at the 5% (or stronger 1%) level. The number 
of countries where cross-border net bank credit significantly causes equity returns increases 
fourfold from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, and the average coefficient of lagged bank 
credit in the market returns equation increases substantially from -0.097 to -0.600 for EMs.  
23 
 
 
 
Finally, we redefine the crisis period for the VAR model estimation to commence on 
August 2007 which produces very similar evidence (if anything, stronger) on the key crisis 
transmission role of cross-border bank credit. The results are shown in Panel H of Table V. 13  
Taken together, the main VAR estimation results reported in Table III together with the 
battery of robustness checks reported in Table V reveal that during the crisis period not only 
cross-border net bank credit plays a key role as driver of equity returns but there is also a 
consistent pattern in the relative magnitude of the effect of lagged bank credit on equity returns 
across groups. Generally, the largest coefficients of net bank credit pertain to the EM group 
followed by the Latin American countries (all five of which are also classified as EMs). The 
finding that the EM group stands out is aligned with recent studies that underline the impact of 
the recent financial crisis on EMs; see, e.g. Dooley and Hutchinson (2009) and Bartram and 
Bodnar (2009). Moreover, the finding is aligned with the fact that, as shown in Appendix B, 
both the total (cumulated) and average net bank credit flows over the January 1998 to 
December 2006 period that precedes the U.S. financial crisis are largest (taking positive values) 
for EMs; a similar observation applies to total capital flows.  
The correlation between the country VAR coefficient of lagged net bank credit in the equity 
market return equation (Appendix A) and the average net capital flows prior to the crisis 
(Appendix B) across all 36 countries is negative at -3.26%. This negative correlation tentatively 
suggests that capital outflows (i.e., positive net flows) in the pre-crisis period tend to be 
associated with large and negative coefficient estimates of net bank credit in the crisis period. 
We also observe that, precisely, for the EM group (and the Latin American subgroup) the 
average net bank credit experiences a reversal, that is, it switches sign from positive (outflows) 
                                                        
13 As a by-product of our multi-equation VAR modeling approach, we find strong evidence that during the crisis period from 
January 2007 to December 2012 the coefficient of the lagged Fed rate in the net trade equation is significantly negative in the 
equally-weighted average data estimation for OAE, EM, Asian and Latin American countries; this evidence supports the 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” effect. The coefficients of lagged net equity, bond or capital flows in the net trade equation are mostly 
insignificant; only for the EM and Latin American groups the coefficient is significant and negative which only mildly reveals 
a “credit constraint” effect during the crisis. 
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in the pre-crisis sample period from January 1998 to December 2006 to negative (inflows) in 
the crisis period from January 2007 to December 2012. In fact, such switch from positive net 
bank credit to negative net bank credit for EMs is already observed in the last pre-crisis year 
(c.f. Panels I and II of Appendix B). The same observations apply to net capital flows as a 
whole.14 It is then plausible to find for the EM countries  whose long-run average of capital 
flows prior to the crisis suggest relatively large reliance on bank credit outflows from the U.S. 
 that their equity market returns are highly sensitive to the retrenchment of U.S. bank credit 
outflows in the aftermath of the subprime crisis.  
5.  Conclusions  
This paper examines various plausible fundamental channels of transmission of the U.S. 
financial crisis towards the equity markets of 36 countries using standard multi-equation time-
series modeling techniques. Using data sampled monthly from January 1988 to December 2012, 
we estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models to capture the joint dynamics of a set of 
endogenous variables that comprise equity market returns, cross-border capital (equity, bond 
and bank credit) flows and international trade, while controlling for investor-fear risk, 
commodity market risk and U.S. long-term interest rates as exogenous or push factors. We test 
for the presence of causality from cross-border portfolio (equity and bond) flows, bank credit 
flows, and international trade towards worldwide equity market returns.  
The analysis is conducted separately for capital flows and trade measured in gross and net 
terms. Moreover, the VAR coefficients are estimated using average data across countries  
Eurozone advanced economies (EU), other advanced economies (OAE), emerging markets 
(EM), Asian and Latin American countries  and individual country data in order to obtain 
                                                        
14 An ancillary observation that also differentiates the EM group (and Latin American subgroup) from the other groups is that 
the cross-section variation in net bank credit and total net capital flows, as measured by the standard deviation across countries, 
increases very little from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period, or even decreases when we compare the last year pre-crisis 
and the first year of the crisis period. 
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panel coefficient estimates that accommodate full heterogeneity across countries. 
The results from an eclectic VAR-based methodology that includes Granger causality tests, 
generalized impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions indicate 
that cross-border bank credit did play a predominant role in the transmission of the U.S. 
financial crisis to worldwide equity markets. This finding is pervasive across country groups 
but the magnitude of the transmission effect from bank credit to equity market returns is 
stronger for EM countries. More clear-cut evidence is obtained when we measure capital flows 
and trade in net rather than gross terms. These findings are confirmed by various robustness 
tests redefining the endogenous and exogenous vectors of variables in the VAR models, 
measuring the equity indices in local currencies, weighing the countries according to equity 
market capitalization, and treating August 2007 as start date of the U.S. financial crisis. 
The paper adds to a recent literature arguing that a side effect of the banking globalization 
phenomena is that cross-border bank credit flows have become, both on account of their size 
and reversibility, relatively more worrisome to risk managers (e.g., Acharya and Merrouche, 
2012; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a,b,c; Fuertes et al., 2015). It also lends motivation to 
studies that seek to uncover the main determinants of the retrenchment in bank flows country-
by-country during the crisis (Buch and Goldberg, 2014, and references therein), and studies 
that propose bank flows as the main indicator of global liquidity (e.g., Bank for International 
Settlements, 2011). As regards to policy lessons, our findings endorse the efforts made by 
policymakers and international organizations to implement better surveillance of a market’s 
external exposure to other markets, to encourage banks to implement more sound risk 
management as well as improved prudential banking regulations, together with capital controls. 
Specifically, they support the IMF position that capital controls are a useful tool for managing 
flows and can be used, on a case-by-case basis, in appropriate circumstances (Ostry et al., 2010).  
There are some caveats to our investigation. Ideally, we should rely on an economic theory 
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to capture the transmission of the U.S. financial crisis. In the absence of a generally accepted 
theory, we formulate VAR models to gauge the relative contributions of various plausible crisis 
transmission channels. We focus on equity markets and do not consider real estate markets as 
it is hard to find comparable house market price data for such a large cross-section of 36 
developed and emerging markets and long time span. This is an avenue for future research. A 
natural limitation of our study in terms of policy lessons is that, of course, a future crisis could 
be triggered by a new segment of the capital markets and transmitted through different channels.   
27 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We wish to thank three anonymous referees, and participants at 8th International Workshop of 
Methods in International Finance Network (MIFN) in Paris, the 39th Simposium of the Spanish 
Economic Association in Palma de Mallorca, the 2014 annual PhD conference of Cass Business 
School in London, the 2015 Université libre de Bruxelles Research Workshop in Brussels, and 
the 2015 Financial Management Association European Meeting in Venice, as well as Aitor Erce, 
Simon Hayley, Ian Marsh, Thomas Nitschka, Lucio Sarno, Marius Zoican for comments. 
   
28 
 
 
 
References 
Acharya V., and O. Merrouche (2012). Precautionary hoarding of liquidity and interbank 
markets: Evidence from the subprime crisis. Review of Finance 17, 107–160. 
Baldwin, R. (2009). The great trade collapse: Causes, consequences and prospects, VOXEU e-
book. 
Bank for International Settlements (2011). Global liquidity-concept, measurement and policy 
implications: Report submitted by an ad-hoc group established by the committee on the 
global financial system.  
Bartram, S. M., and G. M. Bodnar (2009). No place to hide: The global crisis in equity markets 
in 2008/2009. Journal of International Money and Finance 28, 1246-1292. 
Bekaert, G., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., and A. J. Mehl (2014). Global crises and equity 
market contagion, Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. R., and R. L. Lumsdaine (2002). The dynamics of emerging market 
equity flows, Journal of International Money and Finance 27, 295-350. 
Bekaert, G., Hoerova, M., and M. L. Duca (2013). Risk, uncertainty and monetary policy, 
Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 771–788. 
Blanchard, O.J., Das, M., and H. Faruqee (2010). The initial impact of the crisis on emerging 
market countries. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring, 263–307. 
Brière, M., Chapelle, A. and A. Szafarz (2012). No contagion, only globalization and flight to 
quality. Journal of International Money and Finance 31, 1729-1744.  
Broner, F. A., Gaston Gelos, R., and C. M. Reinhart (2006). When in peril, retrench: Testing 
the portfolio channel of contagion. Journal of International Economics 69, 203-230. 
Broner, F., Didier, T., Erce, A., and S. L. Schmukler (2013). Gross capital flows: Dynamics and 
crises. Journal of Monetary Economics 60, 113-133. 
Bruno, V., and H. S. Shin (2012). Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, 
Paper presented at the 11th BIS Annual Conference. 
Brun-Aguerre, R., Fuertes, A.-M., and K. Phylaktis (2012). Country and time-variation in 
exchange rate pass-through: What drives it? Journal of International Money and Finance 
31, 818-844. 
Buch, C. M. and L. S., Goldberg, (2014). International banking and liquidity risk transmission: 
lessons from across countries, Staff Reports 675, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Bussière M., and Callegari, G., Ghironi F., Sestieri, G., and N., Yamano, (2013). Estimating 
Trade Elasticities: Demand Composition and the Trade Collapse of 2008-2009, American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 5, 118-51. 
Bussière, M., C., Gong, M., Chinn, and N., Lisack, (2015). For a few dollars more: Reserves 
29 
 
 
 
and growth in times of crises, Journal of International Money and Finance, 52, 127-145. 
Caballero, R. J., and A., Krishnamurthy. (2008). Collective risk management in a flight to 
quality episode. Journal of Finance, 63, 2195-2230. 
Cetorelli, N., and L. S. Goldberg (2012a). Banking globalization and monetary 
transmission.  Journal of Finance 67, 1811-1843. 
Cetorelli, N., and L. S. Goldberg (2012b). Follow the money: Quantifying domestic effects of 
foreign bank shocks in the great recession. American Economic Review 102, 213-218. 
Cetorelli, N., and L. S. Goldberg (2012c). Liquidity management of U.S. global banks: Internal 
capital markets in the great recession. Journal of International Economics 88, 299-311. 
Claessens, S., Dell'Ariccia, G., Igan, D., and L., Laeven, (2010). Cross-country experiences 
and policy implications from the global financial crisis. Economic Policy 62, 269–293. 
Claessens, S, Tong, H. and S. J. Wei (2012). From the financial crisis to the real economy: 
using firm-level data to identify transmission channels. Journal of International 
Economics 88, 375–387. 
Dahlquist, M., and G. Robertsson (2004). A note on foreigners’ trading and price effects across 
firms. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 615–632. 
De Haas, R., and Van Horen, N. (2013). Running for the exit? International bank lending during 
a financial crisis. Review of Financial Studies, 26(1), 244-285. 
Dooley, M., and M., Hutchison (2009). Transmission of the U.S. subprime crisis to emerging 
markets: evidence on the decoupling-recoupling hypothesis. Journal of International 
Money and Finance 28, 1331–1349. 
Eichengreen, B., Mody, A., Nedeljkovic, M., and L. Sarno (2012). How the subprime crisis 
went global: evidence from bank credit default swap spreads. Journal of International 
Money and Finance 31, 1299-1318. 
Fei, F., Fuertes, A.-M., and E. Kalotychou (2013). Modeling dependence in CDS and equity 
markets: dynamic copula with Markov-switching, SSRN Working Paper 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2161570. 
Forbes, K. J.  (2013). The “Big C”: Identifying and mitigating contagion. Jackson Hole 
Symposium Hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Forbes, K. J., and R. Rigobon (2002). No contagion, only interdependence: Measuring stock 
market comovements. Journal of Finance 57, 2223-2261. 
Forbes, K. J., and F. E. Warnock (2012). Capital flow waves: Surges, stops, flight, and 
retrenchment. Journal of International Economics 88, 235-251. 
Frankel, J., and G. Saravelos, (2012). Can leading indicators assess country vulnerability? 
30 
 
 
 
Evidence from the 2008–09 global financial crisis, Journal of International Economics, 
87(2), 216-231. 
Froot, K.A., O’Connell, P., and M.S. Seasholes (2001). The portfolio flows of international 
investors. Journal of Financial Economics 59, 151–194. 
Fuertes A-M, Phylaktis, K., and C. Yan (2015). Hot money in bank credit flows to emerging 
markets during the banking globalization era, Journal of International Money and 
Finance (forthcoming). 
Glick, R., and A. K. Rose (1999). Contagion and trade: Why are currency crises regional? 
Journal of International Money and Finance 18, 603-617. 
Gourinchas, P., and H. Rey (2007). International financial adjustment. Journal of Political 
Economy 115, 665-703. 
Kamin, S. B., and L. P. DeMarco (2012). How did a domestic housing slump turn into a global 
financial crisis? Journal of International Money and Finance 31, 10-41. 
Levchenko, A., and P. Mauro (2007). Do some forms of financial flows help protect against 
“sudden stops”? World Bank Economic Review 21, 389-411. 
McKinnon, R. (2014). Hot money flows, cycles in primary commodity prices, and financial 
control in developing countries, Stanford working paper. 
Milesi-Ferretti, G., and C. Tille (2011). The great retrenchment: International capital flows 
during the global financial crisis. Economic Policy 26, 289-346. 
Ostry J., Ghosh, A. R., Habermeier, K., Chamon, M., Qureshi, M. S., and D., Reinhardt. (2010). 
Capital inflows: The role of controls, IMF Staff Position Note 10/04. 
Pesaran, H., and Y., Shin (1998). Generalized impulse response analysis in linear multivariate 
models. Economics Letters 58, 17–29. 
Pesaran, H., and R. Smith (1995). Estimation of long-run relationships from dynamic 
heterogeneous panels. Journal of Econometrics 68, 79-113. 
Rallis, G., Miffre, J., and A.M., Fuertes (2013). Strategic and tactical roles of enhanced 
commodity indices, Journal of Futures Markets 33, 965-992. 
Rey, H. (2013). The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City working paper. 
Rose, A., and M. Spiegel (2010). Causes and consequences of the 2008 crisis: International 
linkages and American exposure. Pacific Economic Review 15, 340–363. 
Rose, A., and M. Spiegel (2011). Cross-country causes and consequences of the crisis: An 
update. European Economic Review 55, 309–324. 
Sarno, L., and M. Taylor (1999). Hot money, accounting labels and the permanence of capital 
31 
 
 
 
flows to developing countries: An empirical investigation, Journal of Development 
Economics 59, 337-364.  
Shin, H. S. (2012). Global banking glut and loan risk premium. IMF Economic Review 60, 155-
192. 
Tong, H., and S. Wei (2011). The composition matters: Capital inflows and liquidity crunch 
during a global economic crisis. Review of Financial Studies 24, 2023-2052.  
Warnock, F. E. and V. C. Warnock (2009). International capital flows and U.S. interest rates. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 28, 903-919. 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
                                 Panel A. Individual EU equity markets     Panel B. Individual OAE equity markets 
 
Panel C. Individual EM equity markets                            Panel D. Regional equity markets      
 
Figure I. Equity market prices. The figure plots in Panels A, B and C the dividend-adjusted MSCI equity prices in US$ for Eurozone advanced economies 
(EU), other advanced economies (OAE), and emerging markets (EM). The country names are listed in Table I. Panel D plots the equity market prices for five 
groups computed as the equal-weighted average of the individual MSCI equity prices. The sample period is from January 1988 to December 2012. The vertical 
line conservatively on January 2007 marks the start of the U.S. financial crisis triggered by events in the mortgage sector. 
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Panel A. Monthly trade for Brazil 
 
Panel B. Monthly trade for Philippines 
 
Figure II. Bilateral trade with U.S. of Brazil and Philippines. The figure plots monthly net 
trade (exports - imports), gross trade (exports + imports), exports and imports for Brazil and Philippines 
in current US$ million scaled by domestic GDP in current US$ billion from January 1988 to December 
2012. Exports denote the scaled amount flowing from the given country to the U.S. on account of 
purchases of U.S. goods and services (exports from the U.S. to Brazil and Philippines). The negative 
imports plotted denote the scaled amount flowing from the U.S. to the given country on account of U.S. 
purchases of goods and services (imports to the U.S.). The vertical line on January 2007 conservatively 
marks the start of the U.S. financial crisis triggered by events in the mortgage sector. 
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                Panel A. Gross bank credit           
 
 
Panel B. Net bank credit 
 
 
 
Figure III. Cross-border bank credit flows. The figure shows monthly cross-border gross and net 
bank credit for various country groupings and for six individual countries (Switzerland, Ireland, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Hungary and the UK) in current US$ million scaled by domestic GDP in current US$ billion. 
The sample period is January 1988 to December 2012. The vertical line on January 2007 conservatively 
marks the start of the U.S. financial crisis triggered by events in the mortgage sector. 
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Panel A: Response to gross equity flows    Panel B: Response to gross bond flows     Panel C: Response to gross bank credit      Panel D: Response to gross trade 
 
 
Panel E: Response to net equity flows      Panel F: Response to net bond flows        Panel G: Response to net bank credit         Panel H: Response to net trade 
 
Figure IV. Generalized impulse response functions of equity returns. The figure plots cumulative generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) of 
equity returns to one-unit standard deviation shocks to either bilateral equity flows, bond flows, bank credit flows or international trade with the U.S. defined 
in gross and net terms. The GIRFs are computed from the VAR coefficients reported in Table II over the crisis period. EU denotes Eurozone advanced economies, 
OAE are other advanced economies, EM are emerging markets. The vertical axis is returns in percentages and the horizontal axis is months. The sample period 
is January 2007 to December 2012.   
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Table I. Sample description. The value-weights expressed in percentages are standardized equity market capitali0zation figures for 2012:12. EU are Eurozone advanced 
economies, OAE are other advanced economies, EM are emerging markets. TOP and BOTTOM are country rankings according to average equity flows, bond flows, bank 
credit flows, total capital flows and trade (in net terms only) in current US$ million scaled by domestic GDP in current US$ billion (reported in parenthesis). The sample 
period for each country refers to the longest time span for which data are available on all the country-specific capital flows, trade and market return variables. 
Sample Value- Latin
period weight EU OAE EM Asia America
Argentina AG Jan88-Dec12 0.11 AG AG AG (0) AG (-9) AG (-9)
Australia AU Jan88-Dec12 4.07 AU AU (0.1) AU (0.2) AU (3) AU (3) AU (1)
Germany BD Jan88-Dec12 4.64 BD BD (-0.1) BD (-4) BD (-5)
Belgium BG Jan01-Dec12 0.94 BG BG (5.2) BG (2) BG (-0.2) BG (-13) BG (-8)
Brazil BR Jan88-Dec12 3.83 BR BR BR (0.3) BR (13) BR (13) BR (-0)
Colombia CB Jan93-Dec12 0.82 CB CB CB (-0.2)
China CH Jan93-Dec12 11.54 CH CH CH (-1.5) CH (-5) CH (-4)
Chile CL Jan88-Dec12 0.96 CL CL CL (25) CL (24) CL (1) CL (-0.8)
Canada CN Jan88-Dec12 6.44 CN CN (17) CN (16) CN (-0.2) CN (-0.6) CN (-3)
Czech Rep CZ Jan95-Dec12 0.12 CZ CZ (-0.1) CZ (-0.5)
Spain ES Jan88-Dec12 3.11 ES ES (0)
Finland FN Jan88-Dec12 0.49 FN FN (0.1) FN (37) FN (37)
France FR Jan88-Dec12 5.69 FR FR (8) FR (8) FR (-0.1)
Hong Kong HK Jan88-Dec12 3.45 HK HK HK (0.3) HK (2) HK (-8.0) HK (-33) HK (-41)
Hungary HN Jan95-Dec12 0.07 HN HN (0.2)
Indonesia ID Jan88-Dec12 1.24 ID ID ID (0.1) ID (-0.0) ID (-2)
India IN Jan93-Dec12 3.94 IN IN IN (0.1) IN (-0.0)
Ireland IR Jan95-Dec12 0.34 IR IR (-0.1) IR (9) IR (8) IR (-0.7) IR (-5)
Italy IT Jan88-Dec12 1.50 IT IT (-0.2)
Japan JP Jan88-Dec12 11.44 JP JP JP (0.1) JP (8) JP (7) JP (-1.2) JP (-1)
South Korea KO Jan89-Dec12 3.68 KO KO KO (0.2) KO (14) KO (14) KO (-0.6) KO (-1)
Mexico MX Jan88-Dec12 1.65 MX MX MX (-3)
Malaysia MY Jan88-Dec12 1.49 MY MY MY (0.2) MY (-7) MY (-8) MY (-8)
Netherlands NL Jan88-Dec12 2.03 NL NL (0.1) NL (9) NL (9) NL (2) NL (-0.4)
Norway NW Jan88-Dec12 0.79 NW NW (-0.6) NW (-1.1) NW (-7) NW (-9)
Austria OE Jan88-Dec12 0.33 OE
Philippines PH Jan88-Dec12 0.82 PH PH PH (0.1) PH (-0.1) PH (-4) PH (-2)
Poland PO Jan93-Dec12 0.55 PO PO (0) PO (-4) PO (-5)
Russia RS Jan95-Dec12 2.72 RS RS (-5) RS (-5)
South Africa SA Jan93-Dec12 1.90 SA SA (0.1) SA (0.2)
Sweden SD Jan88-Dec12 1.75 SD SD (12) SD (12) SD (-0.2) SD (-1)
Singapore SP Jan88-Dec12 1.34 SP SP SP (-0) SP (-1.4) SP (-4.4) SP (-76) SP (-82)
Switzerland SW Jan88-Dec12 3.37 SW SW (42) SW (41) SW (-0) SW (-0.4) SW (-1.2)
Thailand TH Jan88-Dec12 1.20 TH TH TH (0.1) TH (-4)
Taiwan TW Jan91-Dec12 2.29 TW TW TW (0.5) TW (-2.2) TW (-34) TW (-35) TW (-4)
UK UK Jan88-Dec12 9.46 UK UK (-0) UK (-0.4) UK (-5.7) UK (-21) UK (-27)
All countries Income
Name flows credit flows
BOTTOM ranked by net  capital flows/trade
equity bond bank capital trade
flows credit flowsflows flows
Geography TOP ranked by net  capital flows/trade
equity bond bank capital trade
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Group/ value-
country weight % Jan07 Jan10 D%
Advanced Eurozone countries (EU)
OE 1.74 7913 3738 -52.76
BG 4.91 15992 8425 -47.32
FN 2.59 1013 776 -23.33
FR 29.84 7124 6202 -12.95
BD 24.33 5361 5026 -6.24
IR 1.78 873 224 -74.35
IT 7.86 1777 1239 -30.26
NL 10.65 13896 12549 -9.69
ES 16.29 5072 5499 8.42
Average -27.61
StDev 26.27
Other advanced economies (OAE)
AU 8.45 3645 4185 14.81
CN 13.36 4701 5285 12.41
CZ 0.24 753 859 14.07
HK 7.16 30373 33512 10.33
JP 23.74 5548 4011 -27.71
KO 7.64 455 467 2.50
NW 1.64 10314 9299 -9.84
SP 2.77 7646 8994 17.63
SD 3.63 21586 18471 -14.43
SW 6.99 9289 8744 -5.87
TW 4.76 367 391 6.46
UK 19.62 7003 5623 -19.69
Average 0.06
StDev 15.17
Equity market price
Group/ value-
country weight % Jan07 Jan10 D%
Emerging markets (EM)
AG 0.33 4682 3357 -28.30
BR 11.67 4701 8501 80.82
CL 2.94 3428 5117 49.25
CH 35.16 71 95 32.94
CB 2.49 956 1518 58.78
HN 0.20 1205 962 -20.19
IN 12.01 495 615 24.17
ID 3.77 764 1181 54.56
MY 4.52 435 568 30.59
MX 5.01 7848 7867 0.24
PH 2.51 349 400 14.54
PO 1.69 1537 1269 -17.39
RS 8.27 1468 983 -33.07
SA 5.79 671 776 15.79
TH 3.64 326 438 34.49
Average 19.81
StDev 34.18
Asian countries
CH 28.74 71 95 32.94
HK 8.59 30373 33512 10.33
ID 3.08 764 1181 54.56
IN 9.82 495 615 24.17
JP 28.49 5548 4011 -27.71
KO 3.50 455 467 2.50
MY 3.70 435 568 30.59
PH 2.05 349 400 14.54
SP 3.33 7646 8994 17.63
TH 2.98 326 438 34.49
TW 5.71 367 391 6.46
Average 18.23
StDev 21.36
Latin American countries
AG 1.45 4682 3357 -28.30
BR 52.00 4701 8501 80.82
CB 11.11 956 1518 58.78
CL 13.10 3428 5117 49.25
MX 22.35 7848 7867 0.24
Average 32.16
StDev 44.84
Equity market priceTable II. Descriptive statistics for equity 
markets. The table reports in column 2 for 
each of the five country groupings  EU, OAE, 
EM, Asia and Latin American  the value-
weight of each country component or equity 
market capitalization as of December 2012 
appropriately standardized to sum to 100. The 
last three columns report the equity market 
level on January 2007 and January 2010, and 
corresponding percentage change. The country 
name abbreviations are explained in Table I. 
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Table III. VAR coefficients and Granger-causality tests. The table reports coefficients estimates of the equity returns (ret) equation corresponding to 
one-month lagged gross or net equity flow (gef or nef), gross or net bond flow (gbf/ nef), gross or net bank credit (gbc/nbc), and gross or net trade (gt/nt).  The 
numbers in the second row (in italics) are t-statistics for the null hypothesis of ‘no Granger-causality’ from capital flows or trade to equity returns or that the 
corresponding coefficient of lagged capital flow or trade is zero. The VAR coefficients and covariance matrix are estimated by OLS. ** and *** in the shaded 
area indicate that the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality is rejected at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using the exact Student t distribution with T-k 
degrees of freedom where k=10 is the number of parameters in each equation. Left (right) panel results are for the model for gross (net) capital flows and trade 
variables. Panel I pertains to the pre-crisis period 1988:01-2006:12 and Panel II to the crisis period 2007:01-2012:12. The group countries are listed in Table I. 
 
 
Panel A. Gross  capital flows and trade variables       Panel B. Net  capital flows and trade variables
equal- value- EU OAE EM Asia equal- value- EU OAE EM Asia
weight
s
weight weight weight
Equity flows 0.06 -0.16 0.13 0.08 0.60 0.16 0.39 Equity flows -0.50 0.64 -0.93 -0.16 10.45 *** -0.48 6.68 ***
H1: gef  ret 0.18 -0.31 0.40 1.23 0.49 1.51 0.71 H1: nef  ret -0.53 0.24 -0.99 -0.59 2.97 -1.43 3.57
Bond flows -0.04 0.21 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.01 0.14 Bond flows -0.41 -0.77 -0.16 -0.21 -0.70 -0.36 0.27
H2: gbf  ret -0.35 1.14 -0.17 -0.83 0.32 0.16 0.87 H2: nbf  ret -0.64 -0.61 -0.28 -1.11 -1.12 -1.63 0.64
Bank credit 0.15 0.17 -0.15 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 Bank credit 0.16 -0.30 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.14
H3: gbc  ret 1.52 0.98 -0.86 -0.34 0.32 -0.41 -0.34 H3: nbc  ret 1.68 -0.70 -0.29 0.08 -0.18 -1.66 -0.75
Trade 0.71 -0.08 2.41 0.35 -0.02 0.17 0.18 Trade 0.59 -6.56 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
H4: gt  ret 0.63 -0.03 1.26 0.62 -0.03 0.36 0.23 H4: nt  ret 0.58 -1.34 0.67 -0.78 -0.06 -0.16 0.89
Equity flows 0.04 0.12 -0.33 0.06 -1.69 0.28 -0.72 Equity flows 2.90 4.01 -1.67 0.49 6.46 1.05 ** 0.51
H1: gef  ret 0.10 0.27 -1.10 0.46 -0.83 1.53 -0.85 H1: nef  ret 1.82 1.31 -1.19 1.00 1.39 2.33 0.26
Bond flows -0.15 -0.30 ** 0.00 -0.12 0.81 -0.39 ** 0.36 Bond flows -0.75 -0.15 0.10 -0.82 ** 0.21 -0.50 -0.14
H2: gbf  ret -1.36 -2.01 0.02 -1.78 1.15 -2.16 1.15 H2: nbf  ret -0.88 -0.12 0.18 -2.39 0.22 -1.54 -0.24
Bank credit 0.71 ** 0.18 0.31 ** 0.05 1.68 *** -0.13 0.67 Bank credit 0.82 *** -0.05 0.33 ** -0.51 *** -2.83 *** -0.38 *** -1.84 ***
H3: gbc  ret 2.44 0.71 2.08 0.44 2.55 -0.62 1.82 H3: nbc  ret 2.60 -0.09 2.42 -3.76 -3.82 -3.84 -4.58
Trade -5.22 ** -3.32 -1.26 -1.82 -4.72 -1.11 -4.44 *** Trade -6.80 *** 6.31 0.60 1.09 -1.65 -0.71 0.16
H4: gt  ret -2.07 -0.76 -0.39 -0.91 -1.78 -0.68 -2.68 H4: nt  ret -3.01 0.61 0.14 0.33 -0.28 -0.28 0.04
  Geographical locationAll countries Income    Geographical location All countries Income
                             II. Crisis period (January 2007 to December 2012)
Latin Latin
America America
                          I. Pre-crisis period (January 1988 to December 2006)
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Table IV. Forecast error variance decomposition of equity market returns. The table reports the percentage of the variance of the error made in 
forecasting equity returns due to specific shocks to equity flow (Panel A), bond flow (Panel B), bank credit (Panel C), trade (Panel D), equity returns (Panel E) 
and Fed funds rate (Panel F) at horizons of 1, 6 and 12 months. Panels I and II report the results from two recursive VARs (in gross and net terms, respectively) 
which are the reformulation via the Choleski decomposition of the reduced-form VAR, equation (1), to achieve uncorrelated shocks. Shaded area and bold font 
indicate the largest share across flows and trade. The estimation period is 2007:01 to 2012:12. The group countries are listed in Table I.  
  
Panel I. VAR model with gross  capital flows and trade Panel II. VAR model with net  capital flows and trade
EU OAE EM Asia Latin EU OAE EM Asia Latin
America America
1 2.01% 10.12% 4.00% 14.91% 0.00% 1.26% 0.02% 1.47% 0.46% 1.41%
6 2.98% 11.47% 5.81% 13.65% 5.92% 4.47% 4.26% 3.91% 9.91% 4.17%
12 2.99% 11.47% 5.81% 13.64% 5.92% 4.19% 4.32% 3.91% 10.03% 4.31%
1 0.29% 5.92% 1.42% 4.94% 4.05% 0.15% 4.16% 0.77% 0.41% 6.07%
6 0.31% 9.99% 2.05% 11.59% 7.95% 0.27% 6.16% 2.09% 1.51% 7.11%
12 0.38% 9.99% 2.05% 11.58% 7.98% 0.43% 6.14% 2.10% 1.48% 7.20%
1 11.29% 0.33% 7.29% 0.70% 6.48% 8.25% 1.77% 0.66% 2.22% 4.76%
6 14.57% 0.42% 11.03% 1.10% 6.71% 17.06% 10.38% 9.97% 7.84% 21.41%
12 15.70% 0.42% 11.05% 1.11% 6.72% 25.32% 10.60% 9.98% 8.80% 21.97%
1 4.65% 0.76% 0.08% 0.03% 2.84% 1.69% 0.35% 5.53% 0.29% 0.20%
6 4.34% 1.38% 2.66% 0.36% 7.53% 1.91% 0.54% 4.66% 0.38% 0.51%
12 4.40% 1.38% 2.65% 0.36% 7.53% 2.09% 0.54% 4.66% 0.38% 0.53%
1 81.06% 82.66% 87.01% 79.12% 86.58% 88.58% 91.63% 89.93% 96.22% 87.19%
6 75.80% 76.43% 78.25% 72.89% 71.77% 74.34% 76.97% 77.84% 79.41% 65.88%
12 74.40% 76.43% 78.22% 72.82% 71.72% 63.36% 76.71% 77.83% 77.93% 65.08%
1 0.71% 0.21% 0.20% 0.30% 0.04% 0.08% 2.08% 1.64% 0.40% 0.37%
6 2.00% 0.30% 0.20% 0.41% 0.13% 1.96% 1.70% 1.52% 0.95% 0.92%
12 2.13% 0.31% 0.22% 0.50% 0.14% 4.62% 1.69% 1.52% 1.38% 0.92%
(months)
Panel E. Equity returns Panel D. Equity returns
Panel F. Fed rate Panel F. Fed rate
Panel A. Gross  equity flows Panel A. Net equity flows
Panel B. Gross bond flows Panel b. Net bond flows
Panel C. Gross bank credit Panel C. Net bank credit
Panel D. Gross trade Panel D. Net trade
Horizon
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Table V. Robustness checks. The table shows OLS coefficients estimates for the equity returns (ret) equation corresponding to one-month lagged net equity 
flow (nef), net bond flow (nbf), net bank credit (nbc), and net trade (nt). The second row (italics) reports t-statistics for the null hypothesis of ‘no Granger-
causality’ from capital flows or trade to equity returns or the restriction that the coefficient of the corresponding lagged capital flow or trade variable is zero. ** 
and *** in the shaded area indicate that the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality is rejected at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, using the exact Student t 
distribution with T-(k+1) degrees of freedom where k is the number of estimated coefficients. Each panel corresponds to a robustness check as described in 
Section 4. All panels are based on monthly data from January 2007 to December 2012 averaged with equal weights across the countries in each group except 
Panel H which is based on corresponding equally-weighted average data from August 2007 to December 2012. The group countries are listed in Table I.  
 
(Cont.) 
EU OAE EM Asia EU OAE EM Asia
Equity flows -1.48 0.50 6.35 1.11 ** 0.40 Equity flows -1.70 0.49 6.92 1.04 ** 0.60
H1: nef  ret -1.03 1.00 1.36 2.35 0.20 H1: nef  ret -1.21 1.01 1.51 2.31 0.31
Bond flows 0.09 -0.83 ** 0.32 -0.47 -0.18 Bond flows 0.06 -0.85 0.16 -0.53 -0.16
H2: nbf  ret 0.15 -2.33 0.32 -1.41 -0.30 H2: nbf  ret 0.10 -2.47 0.16 -1.60 -0.28
Bank credit 0.34 ** -0.51 *** -2.91 *** -0.39 *** -1.87 *** Bank credit 0.32 ** -0.53 *** -2.92 *** -0.37 *** -1.84 ***
H3: nbc  ret 2.45 -3.72 -3.81 -3.81 -4.58 H3: nbc  ret 2.36 -3.87 -3.94 -3.79 -4.60
Trade 0.46 1.02 -2.20 -0.86 0.26 Trade 0.80 0.58 -1.83 -0.93 0.38
H4: nt  ret 0.11 0.30 -0.36 -0.33 0.07 H4: nt  ret 0.19 0.18 -0.32 -0.36 0.10
Equity flows -1.45 0.51 6.73 1.10 ** 0.55 Equity flows -1.36 0.47 6.91 0.98 ** 0.43
H1: nef  ret -1.00 1.02 1.46 2.36 0.28 H1: nef  ret -1.00 0.97 1.51 2.18 0.22
Bond flows 0.06 -0.87 ** 0.31 -0.49 -0.18 Bond flows -0.07 -0.85 ** 0.14 -0.50 0.00
H2: nbf  ret 0.10 -2.45 0.31 -1.46 -0.31 H2: nbf  ret -0.14 -2.48 0.15 -1.52 0.00
Bank credit 0.33 ** -0.53 *** -3.08 *** -0.39 *** -1.85 *** Bank credit 0.34 *** -0.53 *** -2.97 *** -0.35 *** -1.64 ***
H3: nbc  ret 2.44 -3.85 -4.00 -3.79 -4.58 H3: nbc  ret 3.00 -4.02 -4.06 -3.81 -4.70
Trade 0.61 0.33 -3.07 -1.21 0.49 Trade 0.54 0.51 -1.86 -1.15 -0.34
H4: nt  ret 0.14 0.10 -0.52 -0.46 0.13 H4: nt  ret 0.13 0.15 -0.33 -0.46 -0.09
Latin Latin
America America
Panel B. Exogenous: VXO, GSCI, 10yTbond, FedPanel A. Exogenous: VXO, GSCI, 10yTbond, TED
Panel C. Exogenous: VXO, GSCI, 10yTbond, TED, Fed Panel D. Exogenous: VXO, GSCI, Fed (Endogenous: 10yTbond) 
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EU OAE EM Asia EU OAE EM Asia
Equity flows -1.74 0.48 6.19 1.00 ** 0.67 Equity flows -1.53 1.01 20.08 *** 1.89 *** 1.72
H1: nef  ret -1.80 1.47 1.92 2.65 0.48 H1: nef  ret -1.21 1.60 3.57 2.84 0.92
Bond flows 0.21 -0.62 *** 0.35 -0.38 -0.07 Bond flows 0.54 -0.07 0.30 -0.50 -0.01
H2: nbf  ret 0.51 -2.68 0.52 -1.36 -0.16 H2: nbf  ret 0.65 -0.27 0.33 -1.25 -0.03
Bank credit 0.25 ** -0.36 *** -1.64 *** -0.30 *** -1.20 *** Bank credit 0.51 *** -0.16 -1.85 *** -0.43 *** -1.68 ***
H3: nbc  ret 2.42 -4.00 -2.68 -3.52 -4.16 H3: nbc  ret 2.81 -1.28 -3.18 -3.74 -3.99
Trade 0.00 0.01 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 Trade 0.46 0.28 3.89 -0.35 -0.57
H4: nt  ret 0.38 2.37 1.19 0.59 0.15 H4: nt  ret 0.06 0.60 1.17 -0.85 -0.13
Equity flows -0.87 0.57 1.74 2.66 *** 0.85 Equity flows -2.57 0.81 10.23 ** 1.65 *** 0.34
H1: nef  ret -1.01 1.84 0.57 2.98 1.64 H1: nef  ret -1.48 1.58 2.13 3.49 0.16
Bond flows 0.37 -0.04 0.07 0.16 -0.01 Bond flows -0.25 -0.85 ** 0.04 -0.68 ** -0.35
H2: nbf  ret 0.91 -0.38 0.66 1.48 -0.09 H2: nbf  ret -0.37 -2.50 0.04 -2.00 -0.54
Bank credit 0.36 *** 0.01 -0.60 ** -0.35 -0.96 ** Bank credit 0.27 -0.53 *** -2.68*** -0.39 *** -2.01 ***
H3: nbc  ret 3.01 0.17 -2.46 -1.36 -2.23 H3: nbc  ret 1.65 -3.99 -3.11 -4.02 -4.77
Trade 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 Trade 0.00 0.01 * 0.01 0.00 0.01
H4: nt  ret 0.03 1.12 0.79 0.92 0.03 H4: nt  ret 0.19 2.11 1.59 0.31 0.89
Panel E. MSCI equity indices in local currency Panel F. VAR estimation with value-weight averaged data
Panel G. Country-by-country VAR estimation Mean Group approach Panel H. US subprime crisis start date on August 2007
Latin Latin
America America
42 
 
42 
 
APPENDIX A 
Country coefficients and causality tests for equity return VAR equation (net variables). The 
table reports the country coefficients (and average coefficients per group) of the VAR equation for equity 
returns corresponding to lagged net equity flow, net bond flow, net bank credit, and net trade; the intercept 
and coefficients of lagged Federal funds rate, lagged equity returns and the global or push factors (VXO, 
GSCI and 10y government bond rate) are not tabulated but available upon request. The estimation method 
is OLS. Rejection of the ‘no Granger-causality’ null hypothesis that the coefficient of either lagged capital 
flow or trade is zero at the 5% level is denoted in light grey and at the 1% level is denoted in dark grey; 
the test is based on t-statistics and critical values from the exact Student t distribution. The pre-crisis period 
runs mostly from January 1988 (see Table I for details) to December 2006.  The crisis period runs from January 
2007 to December 2012. The country name abbreviations are explained in Table I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group/ Equity Bond Bank Trade Equity Bond Bank Trade
country flow flow credit flow flow credit
Advanced Eurozone countries (EU)
OE -0.1090  0.1880 -0.0081 -7.5910 -0.1598 1.0904 -0.0049
BG -0.2390 -0.0463 -0.0932 -0.0018 -0.5362 0.0707 0.2054 -0.0018
FN 1.6070 0.2730 -0.0423 -0.0130 0.2705 2.3235 -0.0415 -0.0085
FR -0.4670 0.1040 0.0321 -0.0008 -0.9786 0.2002 0.1029 -0.0020
BD -0.5840 -0.8030 -0.1450 -0.0021 0.4624 -0.6421 0.7379 0.0011
IR -0.1990 -0.0143 0.0220 0.0007 0.0826 0.0300 0.0905 -0.0013
IT -0.4070 -1.1320 -0.1850 0.0000 0.5712 2.3225 0.3694 0.0054
NL 0.0037 0.0028 0.0960 0.0019 0.1180 0.3491 0.3608 0.0060
ES -0.8250 -0.3650 -0.1570 0.0006 -0.1933 -1.1910 0.2847 0.0064
-0.1355 -0.2476 -0.0316 -0.0025 -0.8660 0.3670 0.3556 0.0000
0.7010 0.4865 0.1262 0.0049 2.5688 1.2044 0.3546 0.0052
Other advanced economies (OAE)
AU 0.0902 -0.2680 0.2520 -0.0031 0.2853 0.4730 -0.0119 -0.0028
CN 0.2200 -0.0096 0.0518 0.0000 0.4114 0.3450 0.4508 0.0032
CZ 0.5690 -0.0860 0.1040 -0.0146 0.5638 -1.0564 0.1876 0.0602
HK 0.3220 0.0329 0.0175 0.0024 3.2885 -0.0311 -0.0514 0.0001
JP 4.5070 -0.4620 -0.0015 -0.0007 1.7056 0.0991 -0.2357 0.0006
KO 3.6450 -0.7300 0.1210 -0.0044 1.2407 -0.2003 -0.0587 -0.0011
NW -0.3570 -0.0278 0.0164 -0.0046 -0.7733 0.0068 -0.0822 0.0062
SP -0.0791 -0.0057 0.0011 0.0043 0.0961 -0.1059 -0.1252 -0.0024
SD 0.1120 -0.5920 -0.0285 -0.0099 -0.4652 0.1835 0.2141 0.0009
SW 0.2310 -0.1130 -0.0010 -0.0003 0.0327 -0.0603 0.0323 0.0015
TW 0.0796 -0.4210 0.0422 0.0005 0.2156 -0.2453 -0.2152 0.0013
UK -0.0165 0.0646 0.0015 -0.0006 0.2767 0.0867 0.0078 -0.0004
0.7769 -0.2181 0.0480 -0.0026 0.5732 -0.0421 0.0094 0.0056
1.5680 0.2699 0.0781 0.0053 1.0803 0.3819 0.1942 0.0174
Panel A. Pre-crisis period Panel B. Crisis period
Average
StDev
Average
StDev
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     (Cont.) 
      
   
Group/ Equity Bond Bank Trade Equity Bond Bank Trade
country flow flow credit flow flow credit 
Emerging markets (EM)
AG 1.0850 0.1310 -0.1140 -0.0211 0.5455 0.2525 -2.4403 0.0099
BR 7.7800 -0.2860 0.1050 -0.0005 1.3263 0.0109 -1.4140 -0.0034
CL 0.4220 -0.0324 -0.0046 -0.0089 -1.0131 -0.1453 -0.2871 -0.0068
CH 4.4120 -0.2520 0.7630 0.0000 0.1822 0.5229 -0.4717 0.0004
CB 4.8970 0.2080 0.1030 -0.0096 1.9867 0.1615 -0.5597 -0.0011
HN 0.1000 0.3780 -0.1670 -0.0116 -2.2534 -0.5255 -0.6992 -0.0071
IN 3.3680 0.0620 -1.0940 0.0081 4.1281 -0.7782 -2.5010 0.0049
ID -3.4210 -0.4370 -0.4790 -0.0093 7.7286 0.7510 -0.0017 0.0144
MY 0.9990 -0.0783 -0.1290 -0.0048 0.9995 -0.0216 0.9652 -0.0009
MX 3.7950 0.0261 0.0437 -0.0004 1.4283 -0.3259 -0.1102 0.0017
PH 0.6750 -0.1170 0.1360 0.0153 5.3785 0.1458 -0.1879 -0.0087
PO 5.7050 -0.1880 0.2400 0.0533 -30.0692 0.2669 0.3067 -0.0004
RS 10.3800 -1.4980 -0.2500 -0.0003 30.8793 -0.0281 0.1407 0.0034
SA 2.3370 0.0684 -0.1670 -0.0173 4.1380 0.6917 -0.8191 0.0037
TH 9.9140 -0.3460 -0.4330 0.0012 0.6699 0.0850 -0.9178 0.0104
3.4965 -0.1574 -0.0965 -0.0004 1.7370 0.0709 -0.5998 0.0014
3.8256 0.4307 0.4057 0.0175 11.8046 0.4175 0.9459 0.0067
Asian countries
CH 4.4120 -0.2520 0.7630 0.0000 0.1822 0.5229 -0.4717 0.0004
HK 0.3220 0.0329 0.0175 0.0024 3.2885 -0.0311 -0.0514 0.0001
ID -3.4210 -0.4370 -0.4790 -0.0093 7.7286 0.7510 -0.0017 0.0144
IN -3.4210 -0.4370 -0.4790 -0.0093 7.7286 0.7510 -2.5010 0.0049
JP 4.5070 -0.4620 -0.0015 -0.0007 1.7056 0.0991 -0.2357 0.0006
KO 3.6450 -0.7300 0.1210 -0.0044 1.2407 -0.2003 -0.0587 -0.0011
MY 0.9990 -0.0783 -0.1290 -0.0048 0.9995 -0.0216 0.9652 -0.0009
PH 0.6750 -0.1170 0.1360 0.0153 5.3785 0.1458 -0.1879 -0.0087
SP -0.0791 -0.0057 0.0011 0.0043 0.0961 -0.1059 -0.1252 -0.0024
TH 9.9140 -0.3460 -0.4330 0.0012 0.6699 0.0850 -0.9178 0.0104
TW 0.0796 -0.4210 0.0422 0.0005 0.2156 -0.2453 -0.2152 0.0013
1.6030 -0.2957 -0.0401 -0.0004 2.6576 0.1592 -0.3456 0.0017
3.8479 0.2340 0.3554 0.0069 2.9580 0.3570 0.8424 0.0063
Latin American countries
AG 1.0850 0.1310 -0.1140 -0.0211 0.5455 0.2525 -2.4403 0.0099
BR 7.7800 -0.2860 0.1050 -0.0005 1.3263 0.0109 -1.4140 -0.0034
CB 4.8970 0.2080 0.1030 -0.0096 1.9867 0.1615 -0.5597 -0.0011
CL 0.4220 -0.0324 -0.0046 -0.0089 -1.0131 -0.1453 -0.2871 -0.0068
MX 3.7950 0.0261 0.0437 -0.0004 1.4283 -0.3259 -0.1102 0.0017
3.5958 0.0093 0.0266 -0.0081 0.8547 -0.0093 -0.9623 0.0001
2.9840 0.1894 0.0909 0.0085 1.1637 0.2328 0.9660 0.0063
Panel A. Pre-crisis period Panel B. Crisis period
StDev
Average
StDev
Average
StDev
Average
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APPENDIX B 
Net capital flows and trade for each country per group. The table reports for each country the period-average bilateral net capital flows and trade of each 
country vis-à-vis the U.S. expressed as current US$ million scaled by domestic GDP in current US$ billion. Panel A reports pre-crisis averages over the entire 
period from 1988:01 to 2006:12 and the last year 2006:01 to 2006:12. Panel B reports averages over the first year of the crisis period from 2007:01 to 2007:12 
and the entire crisis period 2007:01 to 2012:12. In each panel the last three rows report the total sum, mean and standard deviation for each group. The summary 
statistics per group for bank credit flows and total capital flows are highlighted in grey. The country name abbreviations are explained in Table I. 
  
Group/ Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade
country flow flow credit flows flow flow credit flows flow flow credit flows flow flow credit flows 
Advanced Eurozone countries (EU)
OE -0.09 -0.15 1.74 1.50 -0.37 0.22 -0.19 9.17 9.21 -1.37 0.23 -0.23 6.71 6.71 -1.68 0.03 -0.70 5.33 4.66 -1.21
BG -0.58 -0.73 -21.76 -23.06 1.64 -0.42 4.14 10.05 13.76 1.44 -0.17 7.87 31.68 39.39 1.81 0.09 11.12 15.89 27.11 1.82
FN -0.01 0.09 19.08 19.16 -0.62 0.41 -0.36 40.74 40.79 -0.93 -0.06 -0.76 65.50 64.68 -0.72 -0.16 0.27 94.22 94.33 -0.67
FR -0.07 -0.11 1.46 1.29 -0.30 -0.62 -0.72 15.82 14.48 -0.50 -0.43 0.14 32.37 32.09 -0.48 -0.13 -1.28 28.75 27.33 -0.38
BD -0.13 -0.28 -2.22 -2.63 -0.88 0.34 -0.19 -11.86 -11.71 -1.37 0.21 -0.43 -10.44 -10.66 -1.12 0.04 -0.77 -10.50 -11.23 -1.05
IR -0.55 -3.14 2.08 -1.60 -3.26 0.86 -0.73 34.79 34.92 -7.81 -0.94 -1.78 87.77 85.06 -7.27 -1.04 9.33 30.03 38.32 -9.14
IT -0.09 -0.09 0.20 0.02 -0.68 0.07 0.07 8.65 8.79 -0.89 0.14 -0.10 11.02 11.06 -0.82 0.09 -0.39 9.55 9.25 -0.71
NL -0.53 0.28 2.94 2.68 2.03 0.27 -0.79 14.10 13.58 1.67 -1.40 -0.09 28.97 27.48 1.53 0.03 -0.32 29.05 28.77 1.75
ES -0.06 -0.23 -3.48 -3.77 0.13 -0.01 0.67 3.07 3.73 -0.16 -0.06 0.49 7.98 8.42 -0.04 0.01 -0.38 7.60 7.23 0.01
-2.10 -4.35 0.04 -6.42 -2.32 1.12 1.91 124.53 127.56 -9.92 -2.47 5.13 261.56 264.22 -8.78 -1.04 16.88 209.92 225.76 -9.56
-0.23 -0.48 0.00 -0.71 -0.26 0.12 0.21 13.84 14.17 -1.10 -0.27 0.57 29.06 29.36 -0.98 -0.12 1.88 23.32 25.08 -1.06
0.24 1.03 10.44 10.78 1.53 0.44 1.54 15.84 15.70 2.75 0.56 2.81 30.87 30.31 2.63 0.36 4.77 29.78 30.20 3.23
Other advanced economies (OAE)
AU 0.13 -0.05 1.37 1.45 1.23 0.54 -0.28 -6.17 -5.90 1.00 -0.22 -0.31 -1.49 -2.03 0.93 -0.02 0.88 8.41 9.27 0.97
CN -0.14 -0.46 14.39 13.79 -3.19 -0.27 -1.34 28.10 26.49 -4.56 -0.14 -0.45 32.84 32.25 -3.90 -0.22 -0.98 23.49 22.29 -2.32
CZ -0.09 -0.79 1.39 0.51 -0.40 0.05 -0.19 19.02 18.88 -0.69 -0.02 0.03 12.91 12.92 -0.54 -0.06 -0.01 2.27 2.21 -0.56
HK 1.47 -7.65 -39.19 -45.37 0.72 9.34 -27.81 -51.91 -70.38 4.22 -16.58 -19.01 -100.66 -136.25 5.07 -3.61 -9.30 -14.24 -27.15 7.76
JP 0.22 -1.03 4.81 4.00 -1.26 0.05 -1.20 16.03 14.88 -1.72 0.13 -0.20 13.70 13.63 -1.61 -0.09 -1.67 19.02 17.26 -1.08
KO 0.18 -0.72 15.91 15.38 -1.26 0.04 -1.31 11.51 10.24 -1.19 0.05 -0.55 9.13 8.64 -1.05 0.19 -0.40 8.68 8.47 -1.06
NW -0.35 -1.00 -4.82 -6.18 -1.04 0.10 -4.64 -54.63 -59.17 -1.15 -1.11 1.98 -85.93 -85.06 -0.91 -1.30 -1.29 -14.35 -16.94 -0.72
SP -1.59 -4.30 -79.55 -85.44 -1.22 5.70 -4.83 -80.93 -80.06 3.46 3.06 -7.85 -130.50 -135.29 3.38 -0.94 -4.91 -65.78 -71.63 3.72
SD -0.01 -0.34 15.04 14.70 -1.34 -0.09 -1.09 24.11 22.92 -2.03 -0.75 -0.53 10.68 9.40 -1.54 -0.86 -0.18 4.42 3.38 -1.06
SW -0.24 -1.00 16.73 15.50 -0.19 -0.23 -1.35 75.25 73.67 0.03 0.78 0.86 295.15 296.79 0.42 -0.90 -1.79 123.59 120.89 0.28
TW 0.57 -1.92 -27.75 -29.11 -4.22 0.88 -1.97 -35.38 -36.47 -3.43 0.05 1.21 -40.69 -39.43 -2.64 0.21 -3.09 -51.89 -54.76 -2.40
UK -0.32 -5.14 -34.14 -39.61 0.01 -0.54 -10.01 -79.42 -89.96 -0.27 -0.08 -11.34 -58.38 -69.80 -0.20 -0.53 -7.65 20.28 12.10 -0.05
-0.17 -24.38 -115.81 -140.37 -12.15 15.58 -56.02 -134.41 -174.84 -6.35 -14.84 -36.15 -43.23 -94.22 -2.58 -8.14 -30.38 63.91 25.39 3.47
-0.01 -2.03 -9.65 -11.70 -1.01 1.30 -4.67 -11.20 -14.57 -0.53 -1.24 -3.01 -3.60 -7.85 -0.22 -0.68 -2.53 5.33 2.12 0.29
0.70 2.38 29.69 31.73 1.52 3.03 7.80 48.71 51.44 2.53 4.94 6.39 107.96 112.59 2.47 1.05 3.18 46.57 47.51 2.85
I. Pre-crisis period (Jan 1988 to Dec 2006) II. Crisis period (Jan 2007 to Dec 2012)
Total
Average
StDev
Panel A. Jan 1988 to Dec 2006 Panel D. Jan 2007 to Dec 2012Panel C. Jan 2007 to Dec 2007Panel B. Jan 2006 to Dec 2006
Total
Average
StDev
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          (Cont.) 
 
Group/ Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade Equity Bond Bank Capital Trade
country flow flow credit flows flow flow credit flows flow flow credit flows flow flow credit flows 
Emerging markets (EM)
AG 0.02 -0.26 -5.96 -6.21 0.27 0.01 -0.02 -30.29 -30.29 0.31 -0.12 0.41 -23.57 -23.28 0.44 -0.02 -0.28 -19.24 -19.54 0.70
BR 0.17 -0.20 12.76 12.72 -0.25 0.44 -2.07 1.74 0.12 -0.57 0.91 -4.94 5.53 1.50 -0.09 0.54 -1.18 12.93 12.29 0.26
CL 0.09 -0.60 28.39 27.88 0.46 0.02 -0.63 -6.39 -6.99 -1.60 -0.95 -3.73 -12.59 -17.27 -0.41 -0.28 -1.34 12.28 10.66 1.61
CH 0.03 -1.52 -2.80 -4.29 -4.43 0.14 -3.75 0.05 -3.55 -7.19 -0.11 -2.81 -2.24 -5.16 -6.17 -0.03 -1.38 -4.37 -5.78 -4.21
CB -0.02 -0.04 -0.68 -0.74 -0.93 -0.14 0.95 -9.90 -9.09 -1.31 0.09 -0.58 -5.75 -6.24 -0.35 -0.06 -0.68 -5.61 -6.34 -1.11
HN 0.00 -0.04 -2.21 -2.25 -1.25 -0.02 2.58 -1.37 1.19 -1.03 0.16 1.24 -2.22 -0.83 -0.94 -0.02 0.80 0.37 1.14 -0.88
IN 0.07 -0.02 -0.71 -0.66 -0.75 0.26 0.06 -1.63 -1.31 -1.07 0.03 0.09 -1.75 -1.63 -0.61 0.08 -0.10 1.28 1.25 -0.57
ID 0.06 0.00 -0.82 -0.76 -2.46 -0.08 -0.31 -3.81 -4.20 -2.37 0.04 -0.56 -2.65 -3.17 -1.99 0.10 -0.03 -5.00 -4.93 -1.35
MY 0.25 -0.08 -6.78 -6.61 -8.67 0.62 -0.62 -8.05 -8.05 -12.33 0.43 -2.62 -8.19 -10.38 -9.02 0.18 -1.48 -9.69 -10.99 -5.27
MX 0.10 -0.40 3.45 3.15 -2.46 -0.14 -1.12 -16.03 -17.28 -5.57 -0.12 -0.54 -14.02 -14.68 -5.98 -0.23 0.05 -15.78 -15.96 -4.92
PH 0.12 -0.02 0.68 0.78 -2.67 0.17 0.30 -10.85 -10.38 -1.42 0.25 -1.53 -14.80 -16.08 -0.95 0.04 -0.49 -18.84 -19.28 -0.49
PO 0.02 -0.23 -5.30 -5.51 0.01 0.05 0.29 -1.30 -0.96 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 -1.71 -1.69 0.18 0.05 -0.32 -1.24 -1.51 0.01
RS 0.01 -0.64 -4.32 -4.95 -0.65 0.14 -1.60 -7.18 -8.65 -1.27 -0.05 -1.69 -7.24 -8.98 -0.77 -0.02 0.44 -5.69 -5.26 -0.92
SA 0.10 0.05 -0.45 -0.29 -0.22 0.72 -0.18 -5.40 -4.86 -0.97 0.43 -0.15 -5.07 -4.79 -1.03 0.04 0.72 -4.83 -4.07 -0.63
TH 0.06 -0.18 4.64 4.52 -4.19 0.32 -0.63 -5.96 -6.27 -5.86 0.11 -0.76 -5.56 -6.21 -4.86 0.16 -1.00 -6.67 -7.51 -3.92
1.07 -4.17 19.87 16.78 -28.22 2.52 -6.75 -106.36 -110.59 -42.32 1.16 -18.21 -101.82 -118.88 -32.55 0.51 -6.26 -70.08 -75.83 -21.71
0.07 -0.28 1.32 1.12 -1.88 0.17 -0.45 -7.09 -7.37 -2.82 0.08 -1.21 -6.79 -7.93 -2.17 0.03 -0.42 -4.67 -5.06 -1.45
0.07 0.40 8.94 8.92 2.43 0.26 1.42 7.93 7.92 3.45 0.39 1.68 7.08 7.10 2.88 0.19 0.75 9.40 9.31 2.11
Asian countries
CH 0.03 -1.52 -2.80 -4.29 -4.43 0.14 -3.75 0.05 -3.55 -7.19 -0.11 -2.81 -2.24 -5.16 -6.17 -0.03 -1.38 -4.37 -5.78 -4.21
HK 1.47 -7.65 -39.19 -45.37 0.72 9.34 -27.81 -51.91 -70.38 4.22 -16.58 -19.01 -100.66 -136.25 5.07 -3.61 -9.30 -14.24 -27.15 7.76
ID 0.06 0.00 -0.82 -0.76 -2.46 -0.08 -0.31 -3.81 -4.20 -2.37 0.04 -0.56 -2.65 -3.17 -1.99 0.10 -0.03 -5.00 -4.93 -1.35
IN 0.07 -0.02 -0.71 -0.66 -0.75 0.26 0.06 -1.63 -1.31 -1.07 0.03 0.09 -1.75 -1.63 -0.61 0.08 -0.10 1.28 1.25 -0.57
JP 0.22 -1.03 4.81 4.00 -1.26 0.05 -1.20 16.03 14.88 -1.72 0.13 -0.20 13.70 13.63 -1.61 -0.09 -1.67 19.02 17.26 -1.08
KO 0.18 -0.72 15.91 15.38 -1.26 0.04 -1.31 11.51 10.24 -1.19 0.05 -0.55 9.13 8.64 -1.05 0.19 -0.40 8.68 8.47 -1.06
MY 0.25 -0.08 -6.78 -6.61 -8.67 0.62 -0.62 -8.05 -8.05 -12.33 0.43 -2.62 -8.19 -10.38 -9.02 0.18 -1.48 -9.69 -10.99 -5.27
PH 0.12 -0.02 0.68 0.78 -2.67 0.17 0.30 -10.85 -10.38 -1.42 0.25 -1.53 -14.80 -16.08 -0.95 0.04 -0.49 -18.84 -19.28 -0.49
SP -1.59 -4.30 -79.55 -85.44 -1.22 5.70 -4.83 -80.93 -80.06 3.46 3.06 -7.85 -130.50 -135.29 3.38 -0.94 -4.91 -65.78 -71.63 3.72
TH 0.06 -0.18 4.64 4.52 -4.19 0.32 -0.63 -5.96 -6.27 -5.86 0.11 -0.76 -5.56 -6.21 -4.86 0.16 -1.00 -6.67 -7.51 -3.92
TW 0.57 -1.92 -27.75 -29.11 -4.22 0.88 -1.97 -35.38 -36.47 -3.43 0.05 1.21 -40.69 -39.43 -2.64 0.21 -3.09 -51.89 -54.76 -2.40
1.44 -17.43 -131.57 -147.56 -30.42 17.46 -42.07 -170.93 -195.54 -28.89 -12.54 -34.59 -284.21 -331.33 -20.45 -3.72 -23.83 -147.50 -175.05 -8.88
0.13 -1.58 -11.96 -13.41 -2.77 1.59 -3.82 -15.54 -17.78 -2.63 -1.14 -3.14 -25.84 -30.12 -1.86 -0.34 -2.17 -13.41 -15.91 -0.81
0.71 2.39 27.23 29.26 2.55 3.06 8.11 29.09 31.28 4.66 5.20 5.78 46.99 53.99 3.97 1.13 2.77 24.94 26.57 3.72
Latin American countries
AG 0.02 -0.26 -5.96 -6.21 0.27 0.01 -0.02 -30.29 -30.29 0.31 -0.12 0.41 -23.57 -23.28 0.44 -0.02 -0.28 -19.24 -19.54 0.70
BR 0.17 -0.20 12.76 12.72 -0.25 0.44 -2.07 1.74 0.12 -0.57 0.91 -4.94 5.53 1.50 -0.09 0.54 -1.18 12.93 12.29 0.26
CB -0.02 -0.04 -0.68 -0.74 -0.93 -0.14 0.95 -9.90 -9.09 -1.31 0.09 -0.58 -5.75 -6.24 -0.35 -0.06 -0.68 -5.61 -6.34 -1.11
CL 0.09 -0.60 28.39 27.88 0.46 0.02 -0.63 -6.39 -6.99 -1.60 -0.95 -3.73 -12.59 -17.27 -0.41 -0.28 -1.34 12.28 10.66 1.61
MX 0.10 -0.40 3.45 3.15 -2.46 -0.14 -1.12 -16.03 -17.28 -5.57 -0.12 -0.54 -14.02 -14.68 -5.98 -0.23 0.05 -15.78 -15.96 -4.92
0.35 -1.50 37.96 36.80 -2.93 0.20 -2.89 -60.86 -63.55 -8.74 -0.19 -9.39 -50.39 -59.96 -6.39 -0.05 -3.42 -15.41 -18.89 -3.46
0.07 -0.30 7.59 7.36 -0.59 0.04 -0.58 -12.17 -12.71 -1.75 -0.04 -1.88 -10.08 -11.99 -1.28 -0.01 -0.68 -3.08 -3.78 -0.69
0.07 0.21 13.50 13.39 1.18 0.24 1.14 11.99 11.62 2.26 0.67 2.32 10.80 9.72 2.65 0.33 0.59 15.17 14.75 2.56
I. Pre-crisis period (Jan 1988 to Dec 2006)
Panel A. Jan 1988 to Dec 2006
II. Crisis period (Jan 2007 to Dec 2012)
Panel C. Jan 2007 to Dec 2007 Panel D. Jan 2007 to Dec 2012Panel B. Jan 2006 to Dec 2006
Average
StDev
Average
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Total
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